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This thesis examines the impact of hierarchical complexity on corporate opaqueness and how 
this relationship varies under the moderating effect of corporate diversification, quality of the 
home country institutional environment and the host country institutional environment. I 
hypothesize that increases in firms’ hierarchical complexity are related to greater corporate 
opaqueness between the firm and outside investors on the capital market. Using a sample of 
US firms spanning 5 years from 2012 to 2016, I find a statistically and economically significant, 
positive relationship between hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness. The results 
of the thesis further imply that the impact of hierarchical complexity on opaqueness is 
alleviated when there is related corporate diversification and an increasing quality of the host 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
  
Does a firm’s hierarchical complexity, i.e. its complex hierarchical structures derived from 
both the number of subsidiaries and the multiple management levels, affect its level of 
corporate opaqueness? Hierarchical complexity entails both the number of subsidiary 
companies and the number of hierarchical and management layers of firms. In this case, firms 
can become hierarchically complex by adding an increasing number of subsidiary companies 
and potentially attaching a greater number of hierarchical layers. Firms are complex 
organizations. With a number of subsidiary companies operating at the firms’ multiple 
management and hierarchical layers, the subsidiary companies and the multiple management 
levels can result in complex hierarchical structures of the firms and firms can be associated 
with a higher degree of hierarchical complexity by adding subsidiaries to their  ownership 
linkage (Glenn & Malott, 2004). This is because as the functional units and systems of the 
firms, the differentiations and the interactions of the subsidiary companies and the multiple 
management levels can make the firms hierarchically complex, since an organization that 
consists of differentiations and varieties in its functional units and systems is considered to be 
more complex than an organization that consists of less differentiations and varieties (Daft, 
Murphy, & Willmott, 2010, Jablin & Putnam, 2000, Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967, Thompson, 
1967). 
Hierarchical complexity can influence the levels of corporate opaqueness. Opaqueness is 
related to the accuracy and usefulness of firm-specific information released from the firm to 
outside investors and reflects the ease with which firm specific information is accessible to 
outside investors. Hierarchical complexity can affect opaqueness by increasing the information 
friction between firms and outside investors because greater hierarchical complexity can lead 




Thus, hierarchical complexity can prevent outside investors from comprehensively 
understanding firms’ activities and performance. As a result, hierarchically complex firms are 
perceived to be less transparent. In addition, some of the subsidiary companies of hierarchically 
complex firms are located in a number of different countries and geographical regions. Thus, 
firms’ complex hierarchical structures which can involve subsidiaries spanning vast distances 
and the exposure to different economic, political and cultural circumstances can add to the 
complexity and aggravate firm transparency (Aabo, Pantzalis, & Park, 2015, Duru & Reeb, 
2002). Therefore, as one important type of organizational complexity, hierarchical complexity 
can be related to the corporate opaqueness of firms. For example, the Enron Corporation, which 
used to be “America’s Most Innovative Company” for almost a decade, suffered from 
increasing opaqueness and finally collapsed. Enron was a complex enterprise that had 
significant complexity. Enron was comprised of a number of subsidiary companies involved in 
a variety of industries such as energy supplies and commodity trading and some subsidiary 
companies operated business overseas due to Enron’s significant international expansion. Thus, 
the complex hierarchical structures which involved an increasing number of subsidiary 
companies, operating in a variety of industry segments and geographical areas, made Enron 
complex. As a result, Enron’s growing hierarchical complexity increased its opaqueness. The 
firm impaired the information environment of outside investors by hiding losses and masked 
performance through a series of accounting information manipulations and fraudulent 
behaviours. Despite the share price that climbed to the all-time high of 90.56 U.S. dollars, the 
relatively large number of analysts following the firm and the high share turnover, the capital 
market analysts and investors were misled by fraudulent financial reports and deceptive 
information. Consequently, in 2001, a serious case of fraud was found to have been committed 




This thesis casts two main research questions. First, I examine whether hierarchical complexity 
is positively related to the degree of corporate opaqueness. Second, I investigate whether the 
relationship between hierarchical complexity and opaqueness could be moderated by firm level 
and country level characteristics. More specifically, I find a positive relationship between 
hierarchical complexity and opaqueness. Next, I show that this positive relationship holds for 
alternative measures of opaqueness. I then investigate whether the relationship between 
hierarchical complexity and opaqueness could be affected by firms’ business characteristics 
and external regulation environment. In particular, I examine the moderating impact of firms’ 
corporate diversification, quality of home country institutional environment and host country 
institutional environment on the linkage between hierarchical complexity and opaqueness. Last 
but not least, I control for potential endogeneity biases and show that opaqueness is likely to 
be positively related to hierarchical complexity. 
In this thesis, I examine the impact of hierarchical complexity on corporate opaqueness based 
on the following motivations. First of all, the relationship between hierarchical complexity and 
corporate opaqueness is not clear. In most cases, outsiders, including analysts and investors, 
rely on the firm’s annual report and financial statement as the main information source to obtain 
firm information and make investment decisions. In this case, if the management of the firm 
has insufficient information on the firm and has difficulty in analysing and processing the 
information, the quality and quantity of the firm’s financial disclosures and reports may be 
reduced. This adversely affects the information environment of outsiders and subsequently 
makes the firm more opaque. Therefore, the information available to top management about 
the firm and their information processing and analysing capabilities can affect the firm’s level 
of opaqueness. 
Although there is no study that explicitly examines the impact of hierarchical complexity on 




structures on management’s information accessibility and cognition capabilities which can 
influence the level of firm opaqueness. However, evidence on whether complexity stemming 
from hierarchical structures enhances or weakens management’s information availability and 
information processing capability is mixed. One strand of literature argues that the hierarchical 
structures of the firms can ameliorate management’s information availability and information 
validity. Mihm, Loch, Wilkinson and Huberman (2010) show that the hierarchical structures 
of firms can indirectly improve top management’s information environment in that hierarchical 
structures enable managers from each multiple organizational layer of the hierarchy to 
contribute their own sub-piece of information and respective minds to increase the firm’s 
overall managerial quality. Thus, hierarchical structures can improve top management’s 
information analysis quality by enhancing communication efficiency within the organization 
(Mihm, Loch, Wilkinson, & Huberman, 2010, Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005). Chandler (1990) 
argues that hierarchical structures allow management to obtain adequate and objective 
information on the operational divisions and subsidiary companies which enables management 
to make unbiased analysis and evaluations of the firm’s operations and performance. This is 
because hierarchical structures can provide allocations of duties between the parent company 
management and subsidiary managers. Specifically, parent company management makes 
strategies, coordinates business responsibilities among managers of operational divisions and 
subsidiaries and monitors their activities while managers of operational divisions and 
subsidiary companies are assigned specific and detailed business operating authorities. Such 
allocations of duties enabled by hierarchical structures permit the subsidiary managers to make 
more valid and practical business decisions based on the actual situations and conditions of 
each product or geographical lines (Chandler, 1990, Zey & Camp, 1996). As a result, by 
assuming that there are effective monitoring mechanisms that monitor the activities of 




management with information advantages by increasing the parent company management’s 
information availability and information reliability (Chandler, 1990, Hoskisson, Harrison, & 
Dubofsky, 1991, Mahajan, 1986, Simon, 2013, Wang & von Tunzelmann, 2000).  
However, another strand of literature argues that firms’ hierarchical structures can reduce the 
parent company management’s information availability and hamper management’s 
information processing capabilities. Glenn and Malott (2004) argue that hierarchical 
complexity that originates from firms’ increasing number of operational divisions and 
subsidiaries and multiple hierarchical layers can make these operational divisions and 
subsidiary companies be more autonomous and independent. This leads to unrelatedness 
between the parent company and subsidiary companies. Such unrelatedness decreases top 
management’s information availability by aggravating the information disconnections between 
the top management and subsidiary managers. Thus, increasing hierarchical complexity which 
stems from hierarchical structures makes top management become less aware of the activities 
and contingency of subsidiary companies. Prahalad and Doz (1981) posit that the hierarchical 
structures of firms prevent parent company management from comprehensively accessing 
information of the firms’ operational divisions and subsidiaries. Due to the local business 
environment involvement of subsidiary companies, the parent firm is likely to delegate 
management authority to subsidiaries to some extent. When top management delegates some 
authority and responsibility to managers of subsidiaries, such delegation of authority increases 
the unrelatedness between the parent company and subsidiaries and reduces the subsidiaries’ 
dependence on the parent company. Thus, hierarchical structures can impair top management’s 
control over the activities and behaviours of subsidiary managers which provides subsidiary 
managers with opportunities to hide or even distort information that should be reported to the 
parent company management (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2002, Campbell, Datar, & Sandino, 2009, 




Therefore, it can be seen from this strand of literature that although the parent firm may not 
delegate full authority on the decision-making process and managerial discretion to the 
subsidiaries, the firm’s organizational structure can become more hierarchically complex by 
including more subsidiaries, which can decrease the parent firm’s information availability and 
hamper the top management’s cognition capabilities.  
In summary, prior literature provides mixed results in terms of the influence of firms’ 
hierarchical structures on management’s information availability and cognition abilities. From 
the theoretical perspective, there are no prior studies that directly examine the relationship 
between hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness. From an empirical perspective, the 
question of whether hierarchical complexity can be associated with corporate opaqueness is 
not obvious.  
Secondly, corporate opaqueness is of great concern because it can affect firms’ cost of capital 
and investment policies (Durnev & Mangen, 2009, Easley & O'hara, 2004, Myers & Majluf, 
1984). In spite of the importance of corporate opaqueness, however, its linkage to firms’ 
hierarchical complexity has never been directly and thoroughly addressed in business studies 
literature. Thus, the link as to whether and how hierarchical complexity can affect the level of 
corporate opaqueness remains unclear. There are many past studies that investigate the impact 
of complex organizational features such as corporate and geographical diversification on firm 
characteristics, such as CEO market and corporate governance systems (Berry, Bizjak, 
Lemmon, & Naveen, 2006, Boyacigiller, 1990, Bushman, Chen, Engel, & Smith, 2004, 
Jennings, Seo, & Tanlu, 2014, Naveen, 2006), but none has  drawn from a comprehensive study 
that explicitly addresses the relationship between hierarchical complexity and opaqueness.  
Thirdly, inspired by Enron’s case indicating the importance of hierarchical complexity and 




complex organizational forms and corporate opaqueness needs to examine all three types of 
organizational complexity: hierarchical complexity, corporate diversification and geographical 
diversification. Previous studies find that corporate diversification and geographical 
diversification can increase the level of information asymmetry between the firm and outside 
investors, since increasing both types of diversification can provide top management with 
opportunities to undertake entrenchment behaviours and make it more difficult for outsiders to 
fully access firm information and be aware of firm activities (Aabo, Pantzalis, & Park, 2015, 
Bushman, Chen, Engel, & Smith, 2004, Duru & Reeb, 2002, Jennings, Seo, & Tanlu, 2014). 
However, investigations of corporate and geographical diversification are not sufficient to draw 
conclusions on the impact of complex organizational forms on opaqueness. This is because 
corporate diversification and geographical diversification mostly concentrate on the firms’ 
sales diversity across different industry segments and geographical areas which cannot 
comprehensively reflect the type of complexity that is derived from the firms’ complex 
organizational forms and structures. Thus, in this thesis, I examine the relationship between 
hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness.  
Finally, studying the relationship between hierarchical complexity and opaqueness is 
practically important. It can be seen from the example of Enron that an increase in hierarchical 
complexity can be associated with a higher level of corporate opaqueness. Increases in 
hierarchical complexity can lead to information asymmetry between the firms and outside 
investors which adds to the outside investors’ information frictions and makes firms become 
more opaque and less transparent. Increases in corporate opaqueness could significantly affect 
firms’ cost of capital and investment policies. Insufficient access to useful firm specific 
information and a subsequent decreased quality of the investors’ information environment are 
found to increase firms’ financing costs and reduce firms’ efficiency of investment on capital 




Moreover, through influencing the behaviours of capital market intermediaries, such as 
reducing the forecasting accuracy of financial analysts, increasing opaqueness can also affect 
capital market functioning and market efficiency (Duru & Reeb, 2002, Healy, Hutton, & Palepu, 
1999, Healy & Palepu, 2001, Lang & Lundholm, 1996, Rajan & Zingales, 1995).  
Using a sample of U.S. firms spanning 5 years between 2012 and 2016 and employing several 
proxies for corporate opaqueness from the market’s and investors’ perspective, the empirical 
results of the thesis provide support for the positive relationship between hierarchical 
complexity and corporate opaqueness, implying that the degree of hierarchical complexity is 
associated with higher firm opaqueness and lower information transparency. Moreover, I also 
demonstrate that a higher degree of firms’ related corporate diversification and an increasing 
quality of the host country institutional environment mitigate the relationship between 
hierarchical complexity and opaqueness.   
This thesis makes several contributions to the literature. First, this thesis extends the recent 
conceptual and empirical developments that have focused on investigating the impact of 
organizational complexity on firms. In this thesis, I directly address hierarchical complexity by 
integrating the firms’ number of subsidiary companies and the number of hierarchical levels 
which directly construct hierarchical complexity and explicitly investigate the impact of 
hierarchical complexity on firm opaqueness. Thus, as one important type of organizational 
complexity, the direct construct and examination of hierarchical complexity extends previous 
studies that examine how organizational complexity affects the firms both conceptually and 
empirically. Specifically, previous literature investigates organizational complexity through 
the lens of corporate diversification and geographical diversification which argues that 
corporate and geographical diversification reflect firms’ organizational complexity by 
revealing important business and operational information about the firms (Bushman, Chen, 




diversification and geographical diversification can reveal significant operational information 
about the firms, the degree to which these two types of diversification can reflect organizational 
complexity is limited. This is because such diversification mostly indicates the firms’ sales 
diversity and proportions of sales by different industry or geographical segments; it cannot 
directly reflect the dimensions of organizational complexity. In contrast, hierarchical 
complexity more comprehensively reflects organizational complexity by capturing the 
complexity of the firms’ subsidiary companies and hierarchical structures as well as their 
interactions in business operations and activities.  This  is in alignment with the definition of 
organizational complexity indicating that organizational complexity stands for the 
differentiations of the units and systems constituting the organization and their dynamic 
interactions (Anderson, 1999, Dooley, 2002, Glenn & Malott, 2004, Stacey, 2003). Thus, this 
thesis represents an important extension of the construct and examination of organizational 
complexity. 
Second, this thesis is the first study to examine the impact of complexity stemming from firms’ 
complex hierarchical structures on the information asymmetry between the firm and outside 
investors, contributing to the literature that investigates how firms’ complex business and 
operational characteristics affect firm transparency. Extant literature finds firms’ increasing 
geographical diversification, international dispersions and multinationality indicated by the 
proportion of foreign sales can deteriorate the information environment of outside investors 
and  thus increase information asymmetry between the firm and outside investors (Aabo, 
Pantzalis, & Park, 2015, Ashbaugh & Pincus, 2001, Duru & Reeb, 2002, Hope, Kang, Thomas, 
& Vasvari, 2009). These studies have implicitly relied on the assumption that firms’ 
concomitant complex business and operational structures resulted from internationalization 




associated with opaqueness. By providing evidence that firms’ hierarchical complexity can be 
positively related to opaqueness, this study fills a gap in current research.  
Third, this thesis provides some support to the mixed results in prior literature in terms of the 
linkage between firms’ hierarchical structures and the management’s information availability. 
Prior studies show that the adoption of hierarchical structures can increase  top management’s 
information availability and enable  top management to have information advantages (Chandler, 
1990, Mihm, Loch, Wilkinson, & Huberman, 2010, Wang & von Tunzelmann, 2000, 
Williamson, 1979), while other studies show that hierarchcial structure can impair top 
management’s information analyzing capabilities and prevent  top management from 
comprehensively understanding the firm’s business operations and activities (Gilson, Healy, 
Noe, & Palepu, 2001, Glenn & Malott, 2004, Habib, Johnsen, & Naik, 1997, Prahalad & Doz, 
1981). In this thesis, although I do not directly examine the impact of hierarchical structures 
on management’s information availability and cognition capabilities, the findings of the thesis 
show that hierarchical complexity is positively related to corporate opaqueness and a reduced 
quality of outside investors’ information environment. Thus, these findings indirectly imply 
that firms’ complex hierarchical structures can reduce top management’s information 
availability and hamper its cognition abilities. Therefore, the findings of the thesis provide 
some indirect support to the line of literature which argues that firms’ hierarchical structures 
make it difficult for top management to fully and sufficiently get access to firm information.  
The thesis is organized as follows. The next chapter includes the literature review and 
introduces the previous related research. Chapter 3 introduces the theoretical background and 
hypotheses. Chapter 4 describes the methods of the study that detail the exact construct of 
variables. Chapter 5 performs the empirical analysis on the relationship between hierarchical 





































Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I present an overview of the literature and related research which are in 
alignment with my research objectives to demonstrate the line of research on organizational 
complexity and hierarchical complexity and the literature on corporate opaqueness. I first 
introduce complexity theory and its applications in nature science, organization science and 
management studies. I then present the studies of organizational complexity by organization 
and business studies. Lastly, I introduce the previous research on corporate opaqueness.  
As early as the 1960s, organization researchers used the term organizational complexity to 
depict the complex internal structures and functional departments of organizations. However, 
research at this stage mostly regarded organizational complexity as the linear and static term 
that reflected the objective complexity of the organization. With the emergence of complexity 
theory and its successful application in nature science in the 1990s, researchers in organization 
science and management studies employed the models and insights from complexity theory as 
well as its metaphorical implications to transform organization design and improve managerial 
quality. Following this, research advanced the modern studies of organizational complexity by 
regarding organizational complexity as the non-linear and dynamic term that considers the 
dynamic interactions of the organizations’ constitute units, systems and departments. 
Meanwhile, researchers from business studies employ the term organizational complexity to 
reflect the complexity and diversity of the firms’ business activities and examine the impact of 
organizational complexity on various firm level characteristics. The research in business 
studies differs from other lines of research into organizational complexity, since business 
studies use organizational complexity to capture the diversity and reflect business and 




of research mainly depend on the metaphorical implications of complexity theory and 
organizational complexity to qualitatively characterise the features of organizations.  
This chapter provides the foundations for the study in this thesis. First, as one important 
dimension of organizational complexity, I conceptually consider hierarchical complexity based 
on the classic and modern definitions of organizational complexity. The literature reviews on 
complexity theory and organizational complexity allow me to consider the conceptual and 
empirical construct of hierarchical complexity. Second, the literature reviews on organization 
complexity and corporate opaqueness identify the gap in that there is no previous research 
which studies the impact of hierarchical complexity on corporate opaqueness.  I thus fill this 
void in my study.       
 
2.2 Literature review on organizational complexity 
2.2.1 Complexity theory and its applications 
Hierarchical complexity is one important type of organizational complexity. Organizational 
complexity is the term which is used by organization researchers to depict and characterize the 
inter-relationships among functional units and operations of the organization. Organizational 
complexity is advanced by complexity theory which originated from nature science. Thus, in 
this section, in order to provide a finer-grained picture and comprehensive understanding of 
hierarchical complexity and organizational complexity, I introduce the studies on complexity 
theory and its applications in nature science and organization science by presenting the 
literature and related research. 
The entities in the natural world are comprised of a number of constituent components which 
are dynamic and constantly changing, such as the weather systems. The constituent 




terms of the constituent components, some of them are related and interconnected through 
similar sub-level functional units. For example,  meteorological factors such as air movements 
which belong to the same zones are interrelated. Thus, the related constituent components could 
form a number of sub-systems and these sub-systems constantly interact with each other and 
generate physical or chemical changes. Such interactions and changes do not follow any regular 
order and it is difficult to predict them in the future.  Thus, the sub-systems and their 
relationships are non-linear and dynamic and  cannot be modelled or predicted by linear and 
static techniques (Costanza, Wainger, Folke, & Mäler, 1993). Therefore, the constantly 
changing constituent components and the sub-systems as well as their relationships constitute 
the complex systems of the natural world. 
Thus, in order to explain the operations of complex systems and predict the trend of changes, 
nature scientists employ complexity theory to study complex systems. Complex systems exist 
in a range of fields, including chaotic mathematics, biology, psychology, ecology, etc. Manson 
(2001) states that complexity theory is used to explain non-linear and dynamic relationships 
which exist in constantly changing entities, rather than equilibrium and static relationships 
(Manson, 2001).  
Nature science researchers use complexity theory to study the internal interactions among 
complex systems’ functional elements and predict the changes which result from internal 
interactions and relationships within complex systems. Following this, Sambrook and Whiten 
(1997) characterise the complexity of the systems by measuring the degree of system 
complexity. In their study, Sambrook and Whiten (1997) describe the system as composed of 
systematic patterns which can be broken down to the minimum units and levels:  such minimum 
units and levels that are partitioned from the system are referred to as minimum programs 
which are used to describe the system. The patterns of the system are then organized as 




of pattern information and organizational information. Based on this, they argue that the 
system’s complexity is equal to the number of levels of the minimal program. 
In addition to the application of complexity theory in nature science, some efforts have been 
made to apply the models and concepts of complexity theory to organization studies. 
Organization scholars analyse operations and emergent behaviours of the organization by using 
the models and insights originated from complexity theory. The operations and emergent 
behaviours result from the interaction of the organization’s functional units and elements. In 
this line of studies, the study of Dooley and Van de Ven (1999) is based on  chaos theory and 
deterministic complexity (Dooley & Van de Ven, 1999). Chaos theory is applied in the work 
of Lorenz (1996), in which he investigates the changes of the weather system (Lorenz, 1996). 
Chaotic dynamics and deterministic complexity indicate that the outcome of complex systems 
is unpredictable and chaotic due to the interactions of involved factors. Based on this insight, 
Dooley and Van de Ven (1999) establish the model which can be used to explain the four 
dynamic patterns of the event time series of the organizational process. The four dynamic 
patterns of the event time series are the periodic, chaotic, white noise and pink noise. Dooley 
and Van de Ven (1999) argue that periodic and chaotic dynamic patterns are essentially 
governed and determined by precise laws, although chaotic patterns can seem to be irregular 
and appear to be random. In contrast, pink noise and white noise are essentially random. In the 
event time series analysis, the path and pattern are unpredictable in the case of randomness. 
Following this, Dooley and Van de Ven (1999) show that systems with independent factors 
generate periodic and white noise patterns, whereas systems with interrelated dependent factors 
result in pink noise and chaotic patterns. Thus, following the implications of the study, 
researchers can choose and adopt the most appropriate causal process theory to explain the 




Apart from the study of Dooley and Van de Ven (1999), based on the models of complexity 
theory, MacIntosh and MacLean (2001) and Stacey and Griffin (2007) argue that one important 
implication of complexity theory is that the emergence of order and the patterns of behaviours 
of complex systems are manifested through the process of self-organization which is governed 
by a set of order-generating rules.   The rules enable the systems to operate and function on the 
edge of chaos, or the equilibrium between randomness and stasis (MacIntosh & MacLean, 2001, 
Stacey & Griffin, 2007). Under the pressure of changes of the system’s internal and external 
environment, old order-generating rules can  be replaced by a new set of order-generating rules 
so that the system can  evolve and adapt to the constantly changing environment (Bechtold, 
1997). Therefore, based on the intimations above, Morel and Ramanujam (1999) argue that 
models which depict the impact of pressure from both the external and internal environment 
on the organization’s changes should be adapted in organizational research (Morel & 
Ramanujam, 1999). By using the model which is illustrated through a tree paradigm, Morel 
and Ramanujam (1999) demonstrate that changes in the organization’s worst performing units 
can affect the units and routines which are connected to it. Following this, they argue that the 
organization’s rule of evolution and self-organization is different from that of ecology. 
Another representative study is the work by Boisot and Child (Boisot & Child, 1999). Boisot 
and Child (1999) analyse the potential strategies and alternatives which western firms could 
take to handle China’s complex environment when they have subsidiary companies in China. 
According to the complex adaptive system theory, the evolution pattern and emergence 
development of the complex system are determined by the interactions of its local agents and  
such self-organizing ability enables the system to develop and evolve to adapt to the external 
environment so as to survive (Holland, 1992, Stacey & Griffin, 2007). Thus, based on the 
insights of complex adaptive system theory, Boisot and Child (1999) argue that firms could 




uncertainties and the complexity of the external business environment. Specifically, 
complexity reduction strategy refers to directly understanding and addressing geographical 
complexity. Complexity absorption strategy refers to circumventing geographical complexity 
through forming alliances and taking risk-hedging strategies. Boisot and Child (1999) further 
show that the primary strategy which Chinese domestic firms take to deal with environment 
complexity is complexity absorption.  This is different to the complexity reduction strategy 
which is preferred by western firms to deal with environment complexity. Therefore, Boisot 
and Child (1999) point out that in order to reduce the negative impact of environment 
complexity, western firms could choose between complexity absorption and complexity 
reduction strategies, the choice of which depends on the consideration of various factors when 
they operate in China. 
Apart from its applications in organization science, another line of research from management 
studies focuses on using complexity theory to promote organizational change, thus improving 
managerial quality and optimising organization performance. There is a consensus that 
organizations should be able to manage change so as to survive and develop in today’s ever-
changing business environment and the manager’s capability to manage change is regarded as 
one of the organization’s core competencies  (Benn, Edwards, & Williams, 2014, Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1997, Dawson, 2003, Johnson, Scholes, & Whittington, 2002). Thus, with the 
emergence of complexity theory and its metaphorical implications, management researchers 
try to take advantage of the ideas of complexity theory to explain why and how organizations 
should be able to manage change. These researchers argue that like metrology systems, 
organizations and firms are non-linear systems and complex organizations. By using the 
implications of complexity theory, particularly aggregate complexity from chaotic 
mathematics, management researchers argue that organizations should not be stable but rather 




changes should be governed by a set of order generating rules (Lewis, 1994, Lorenz, 1996, 
MacIntosh & MacLean, 1999, Stacey, 2002). In order to be dynamic rather than stable, 
researchers show that managers should reject top-down and command-control styles of 
management  and instead, should encourage diversified views and delegate more powers to 
individuals because individuals are able to shape their present and future through self-
generating rules (Bechtold, 1997, Fitzgerald, 2002, MacIntosh & MacLean, 2001, Stacey, 2003, 
Tetenbaum, 1998). In addition, organizations can only survive through continually  innovating 
and improvising and they should take change as an everyday practice so as to gain competency 
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). 
The studies above show that complexity theory is decomposed into three divisions: algorithmic 
complexity, deterministic complexity and aggregate complexity. Algorithmic complexity is 
defined to be the number of bits or pieces of information which is required to generate such 
complexity (Chaitin, 1990). The measure of algorithmic complexity is to calculate the efforts 
which are  required to solve a mathematical problem and the number of factors needed to 
predict the given amount of the system’s variance, such as finding a shortest path through a 
network (Manson, 2001, Sambrook & Whiten, 1997).  
Deterministic complexity emphasized the resulting outcome brought by the changes of initial 
conditions. By using deterministic mathematics, the notion of feedback and the degree of 
sensitivity to initial conditions, deterministic complexity is applied to investigate the 
unpredictable large and non-linear outcome due to  external causes and changes to initial 
conditions (Fitzgerald, 2002, Stacey, 2003). One application of deterministic complexity is that 
it could be used to investigate the general trend and boundaries of chaos systems, such as the 




Aggregate complexity concentrates on the relationships among the entity’s or system’sdynamic 
constituent parts brought along by their interactions. Within a given system, components which 
are connected tightly form the system’s sub-systems although homogeneous components can 
still display diversity due to the re-structure of their relationships. Such relationships among 
components and sub-systems constitute the system’s internal structure. Based on this, the 
dynamic interactions of these components and subsequently formed sub-systems push the 
system to change and adapt to the complex, external environment and  thus the entire system 
grows and evolves through learning and interactions (Holland, 1992). 
In conclusion, among these three types of complexity, aggregate complexity provides insights 
and valuable information into the study of this thesis. In organization and management studies, 
firms and enterprises with complex business operations and organizational structures are 
characterised as complex organizations and  thus complexity theory and aggregate complexity 
could be applied to depict organizational operations (Alexander, 1993, Brown & Eisenhardt, 
1997, Lewis, 1994, Tetenbaum, 1998). Firms and enterprises which have business operations 
across different product markets and vast distances have subsidiaries allocated in different 
product markets and geographical areas. Subsidiary companies which serve homogeneous 
product markets or the same geographical areas could be regarded as the firms’ sub-systems as 
they are connected to one another through homogeneous ties and relationships.  Thus, 
interconnected sub-systems can be seen as the company’s internal structures and the internal 
structures and their interactions constitute the organizational complexity of the firms. Therefore, 
aggregate complexity provides metaphorical insights into the study of the organizational 
complexity of firms. 
Moreover, deterministic complexity also provides insights into the study of the thesis by 
allowing me to consider interactions between the organization and external environment. When 




deterministic complexity shows that changes in the initial conditions of the outside 
environment may influence the firms and cause some kinds of consequences to the firms’ 
characteristics. Therefore, I also include the impact of the external environment into 
considerations.  
2.2.2 Organizational complexity 
In this section, I present an overview of the literature on organizational complexity and its 
applications in business studies. Researchers from business studies employ the term 
organizational complexity to portray firms’ structures and activities. Research at the early stage 
investigates organizational complexity through differentiations within the organization such as 
organizational size and divisions of labour. Then, with the exuberance of complexity theory 
and its application in the field of nature science and organization studies, the development of 
complexity theory advances the understanding of organizational complexity by including the 
interactions among the organization’s functional parts into consideration. Organizational 
complexity can affect firms in various dimensions, from management to performance and   
researchers therefore study organizational complexity so as to capture the important influence 
of organizational complexity on firms and on transforming firms’ performance. The research 
on organizational complexity can be divided into two strands. The first strand of literature tries 
to capture the determinants of organizational complexity by investigating various functional 
features of the organization. The second strand of literature empirically investigates the impact 
of organizational complexity on various firm level characteristics. I start with the first strand 
of literature. 
2.2.2.1 Determinants of organizational complexity 
Prior to the exuberance of complexity theory and its applications in organization science, 




literature, organization researchers capture the determinants and predictor of organizational 
complexity by examining organization level characteristics and proposing possible measures. 
Hage (1965) suggests that organizational complexity could be captured by the organization’s 
internal specializations which could be measured by a number of specialized occupations and 
the length of required training. Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, Macdonald, Turner and Lupton (1963) 
argue that the size of the organization could be the measure of organizational complexity. 
Based on prior research, Hall, Johnson and Haas (1967) use the division of labour and the mean 
hierarchical levels within organization departments to measure organizational complexity. 
Their study shows that the relationship between size and organizational complexity is not 
strong (Hall, Johnson, & Haas, 1967). However, under the context of US state employment 
agencies, Blau’s deductive theory of differentiation points out that the size of the organization 
is the key internal determinant of organizational complexity (Blau, 1970, Blau & Schoenherr, 
1971). Based on prior research, Beyer and Trice (1979) study the relationship between the US 
federal organizations’ size and various components of organizational complexity. In their study, 
they use the number of employees to measure the organization’s size and four separate 
components to represent organizational complexity, namely:  vertical differentiation, 
horizontal differentiation, and division of labour and personal specialization. Vertical 
differentiation and horizontal differentiation are measured by the number of levels in the tallest 
part of the hierarchy and the number of supervisors or administrative units who report to the 
director of the installation, respectively. The division of labour is measured by the number of 
different job titles, while personal specialization is measured by the salary and educational 
requirements. The study shows that using federal data,  division of labour is an important 
determinant of organizational complexity, while at the same time, organization size is an 
important determinant of organizational complexity in the context of state employment 




Following prior studies and their implications, Boyacigiller (1990) indicates organizational 
complexity by the job levels of professional employees within the organization. Organizational 
complexity is argued to affect the management characteristics of the firms. Boyacigiller (1990) 
examines how organizational complexity could affect the allocation of the proportion of 
managers between U.S. nationals and domestic nationals in managerial staff. The allocation of 
management staff with domestic nationality is one important characteristic of the 
organization’s management structure. The reduction of management staff with domestic 
nationality would result in the parent company’s increased difficulty in  exercising control 
through personnel and coordination in  multinational companies which jeopardizes the firms’ 
overall information processing capabilities and increases uncertainties among independent and 
interdependent subsidiaries (Kobrin, 1982). Boyacigiller (1990) argues that the proportion of 
U.S. nationals in firms’ branch management is positively associated with the increasing 
organizational complexity of the firms due to their technical and managerial competency.  
In summary, the literature shows that organizational complexity can be defined to be the 
amount of diversity or differentiation which exists in the organization and  thus organizational 
complexity could be reflected by the number of its constituent parts and their diversity (Daft, 
Murphy, & Willmott, 2010, Jablin & Putnam, 2000, Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967, Thompson, 
2017). These findings provide some insight for the analysis in this thesis. As one type of 
organizational complexity, based on the definition of organizational complexity, hierarchically 
complex firms consist of different subsidiary companies which operate in diverse business 
operations of the firms. Hierarchical complexity can therefore be reflected by a number of 




2.2.2.2 Empirical examinations of the impact of organizational complexity 
on firm level characteristics 
In addition to the research of organizational complexity which has been advanced by the 
success of complexity theory, the second strand of literature studies organizational complexity 
in the field of business studies. Specifically, this literature focuses on investigating the impact 
of organizational complexity on various firm characteristics.  
The literature finds that organizational complexity can affect many aspects of the firm. In 
particular, scholars have investigated the impact of organizational complexity on management, 
the CEO market, firms’ corporate governance systems and management forecasting behaviours 
(Berry, Bizjak, Lemmon, & Naveen, 2006, Boyacigiller, 1990, Bushman, Chen, Engel, & 
Smith, 2004, Fung & Su, 2006, Jennings, Seo, & Tanlu, 2014, Lee & Yeo, 2016, Naveen, 2006). 
Organizational complexity is decomposed into business complexity and geographical 
complexity. Business complexity refers to firms’ diversification of sales across different 
industry segments. Geographical complexity is determined by the firms’ diversity of sales in 
different geographical areas. Business complexity and geographical complexity are argued to 
reflect organizational complexity by providing important information on the distribution of 
sales across industries and geographical areas which could reveal operational and informational 
complexity of the firms (Bushman, Chen, Engel, & Smith, 2004).  
In regard to the impact of organizational complexity on the CEO market, Finkelstein and 
Hambrick (1989) and Rose and Shepard (1994) find that firms with a higher level of 
organizational complexity tend to hire CEOs with higher capabilities and the replacing of a 
CEO is more costly, since managing a more complex firm requires more advanced managerial 
skills (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989, Rose & Shepard, 1994). Following this, Berry, Bizjak, 




the CEO labour markets. Specifically, this study examines whether organizational complexity 
is associated with CEO turnover and succession patterns. The study uses two methods which 
include dummy variables and a firm’s degree of industry concentrations to measure 
organizational complexity. The study shows that in firms with a high degree of organizational 
complexity, CEO turnover is insensitive to the firm’s financial performance and more complex 
firms experience less forced CEO turnover than less complex firms. In addition, when the 
former CEO vacates the position, the newly hired CEO in more complex firms is  more 
experienced, older and paid more (Berry, Bizjak, Lemmon, & Naveen, 2006). They argue that 
CEO replacement costs are higher in more complex firms than in focused firms due to more 
complex firms requiring CEOs with greater capability and that CEO turnover in firms with 
greater organizational complexity is completely insensitive to firms’ financial performance. 
The research findings above are supported by Naveen (2006). Naveen (2006) shows that 
organizational complexity has significant impact on the benefits and costs associated with the 
succession of CEOs. Firms of higher levels of organization complexity tend to have greater 
costs of succession due to the high costs to transfer firm-specific knowledge in such firms. By 
using firms’ industry concentrations to proxy organizational complexity, measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index, this study further argues that larger and more complex firms are 
more likely to replace CEOs through fostering inner candidates, rather than forced replacement 
(Naveen, 2006). 
Another strand of literature studies the impact of organizational complexity on corporate 
governance systems (Bushman, Chen, Engel and Smith 2004). This study measures 
organizational complexity using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index which indicates firms’ 
industry concentrations and geographic concentrations. The results show that firms’ ownership 
concentration and directors’ equity-based incentives increase with organizational complexity 




management with more opportunities to pursue entrenchment activities, firms require 
strengthened corporate governance systems to reduce agency costs of equity. 
Moreover, Jennings, Seo and Tanlu (2014) examine whether organizational complexity 
influences manager’s earning forecasting behaviours. Following Bushman, Chen, Engel and 
Smith (2004), organizational complexity is indicated by the firm’s industry concentrations and 
geographic concentrations through the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. The study finds that 
increasing organizational complexity can result in decreased quality of communications 
between the firm management and outside investors. Specifically, greater industry and 
geographical diversifications are negatively associated with the management’s forecasting 
accuracy (Jennings, Seo, & Tanlu, 2014). This is because increases in industry and 
geographical diversifications can make it more difficult for the management to gain and analyse 
adequate amounts of business and operational information of the firms which decreases the 
quality and accuracy of management forecast behaviours. 
In conclusion, extant literature mainly focuses on examining whether business complexity and 
geographical complexity affect firm characteristics. No prior research has been devoted to 
understanding the impact of hierarchical complexity on firm opaqueness and transparency 
which is essential to the information environment of outside investors. In this study, I fill the 
gap by examining how firm opaqueness varies with the level of hierarchical complexity. 
2.2.2.3 Hierarchical complexity 
In the previous literature of organizational complexity, Glenn and Malott (2004) provide the 
concept of hierarchical complexity. The study shows that an organization’s hierarchical 
complexity reflects the complex hierarchical and authority structures of an organization which 
is related to the number of diversifying management layers and authority structures. Moreover, 




its business components and departments and its manufacturing technological development 
levels. The number of the organization’s constituent components, elements and professional 
labour specializations increases with the organization’s business scope and technological 
development which subsequently require multiple hierarchical and authority structures as well 
as more management layers (Glenn & Malott, 2004, Thompson, 1967). 
Empirically, in addition to the empirical investigations which examine the impact of business 
complexity and geographical complexity on firms, Altomonte and Rungi (2013) investigate the 
relationship between business groups’ vertical integration, hierarchical complexity and 
productivity. In their study, Altomonte and Rungi (2013) use hierarchical complexity to 
indicate the degree of complexity of business groups’ hierarchical structures. They analyse 
business groups as the hierarchical structures which consist of headquarter and subsidiary 
companies and the hierarchical complexity of the hierarchical structure is indicated by node 
entropy which considers the number of levels and the number of companies at each level. Their 
study shows that hierarchical complexity is positively related to the productivity of the business 
groups. Specifically, they argue that hierarchical structures can internalise the business 
participants such as subsidiary companies within the business group, enabling more effective 
transmission mechanisms, reducing fixed transaction costs and effectively improving the 
transmission efficiency of knowledge and other tangible physical assets. 
In conclusion, hierarchical complexity literature provides an important and valuable insight for 
the study area of the thesis. Conceptually, hierarchical complexity reflects the features of 
complex hierarchical structures which consist of a number of subsidiary companies operating 
at various management levels. Moreover, the literature also shows that hierarchy structures 
may be adapted by firms so as to improve organization efficiency and performance. 
Empirically, following previous literature, hierarchical complexity is reflected by the number 




management purposes. Therefore, I include these two essential elements into consideration 
when constructing hierarchical complexity both conceptually and empirically.      
 
2.3 Literature review on corporate opaqueness 
Corporate opaqueness refers to outside investors’ inaccessibility to firm-specific information. 
Corporate opaqueness is the opposite of transparency which impacts on firms’ capital structure 
and financial performance. Corporate transparency is defined to be the availability of firm 
specific information (Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004). Transparency is argued to have 
significant impact on capital market functioning and efficiency (Healy & Palepu, 2001, Rajan 
& Zingales, 1995), the firm’s equity capital costs (Easley & O'hara, 2004, Francis, Nanda, & 
Olsson, 2008) and capital market intermediaries such as the accuracy of financial analysts 
(Healy, Hutton, & Palepu, 1999, Lang & Lundholm, 1996). In the literature of business studies, 
corporate opaqueness could be divided into two streams. One stream of literature examines 
corporate opaqueness through the lens of transparency, focusing on using firms’ annual and 
financial report disclosures to indicate transparency and corporate opaqueness. The second 
stream of literature studies corporate opaqueness from the market’s perspectives, employing 
firms’ market behaviours and investors’ information environment as predictors of corporate 
opaqueness.  
This first stream of research focuses on firm-specific information availability through corporate 
disclosure reports. Disclosure reports are based on the firm’s annual and financial reports which 
are viewed as the particular important documents which uncover the firms’ financial situations, 
business operations and performance (Botosan & Plumlee, 2002). Thus, transparency is 
regarded to be the financial disclosure intensity which refers to the degree of availability of the 
firm’s accounting or auditing information and governance disclosure intensity. In this line of 




Specifically, researchers construct the score based on firms’ published annual reports by 
selecting the contents of interest from their particular research topic or scheme (Alford, Jones, 
Leftwich, & Zmijewski, 1993, Botosan, 1997, Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004, Healy, 
Kuppuswamy, & Serafeim, 2011, Masry, 2015, Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995, Miller, 2002). 
Alternatively, transparency is also indicated by employing the scoring and ranking reports 
which are elaborated and released by third parties who are leading financial ranking and 
evaluating companies, such as the transparency and disclosure score by Standard & Poor’s 
(Botosan & Plumlee, 2002, Lang & Lundholm, 1993, Lang & Lundholm, 1996, Patel, Balic, 
& Bwakira, 2002, Sengupta, 1998, Welker, 1995).  
For example, Miller (2002) indicates corporate transparency by identifying the disclosed 
information items, having them coded and calculating the number of information items based 
on their disclosure times which is argued to be able to reflect the voluntary disclosure level of 
firms. Miller (2002) shows that firms’ voluntary disclosure is positively associated with 
earnings. Botosan (1997) investigates the relationship between firms’ voluntary disclosure 
level and the costs of equity and finds that increased information disclosure helps firms reduce 
their costs of equity capital. Botosan (1997) divides the annual reports’ disclosed information 
into five categories, namely:  the firm’s background information, summary of historical results, 
key non-financial statistics, projected information and management discussion and analysis. 
By observing whether the required items are disclosed, points are given to the firm if certain 
items are made known to the public through the annual reports. The disclosure score is 
calculated by the summation of points given to the firm which is used to indicate the firm’s 
level of voluntary disclosure and transparency. Similar measures are used by Meek, Roberts 
and Gary (1995) and Alford, Jones, Leftwich and Serafeim (1993). Alternatively, apart from 
self-constructed disclosure scores, researchers also use disclosure ratings elaborated by third 




conduct research on transparency by employing the disclosure scores available from the reports 
of the Association for Investment Management and Research. Botosan and Plumlee (2002) 
show that although firms’ cost of equity capital decreases with the level of disclosure, it 
increases with firms’ timely disclosures which is an obligation that companies have to release 
prompt information to the public, regardless of whether the information is favourable or 
unfavourable. In addition, the disclosure scores and ratings reports from the Financial Analysts 
Federation Corporate Information Committee and Standard & Poor’s are also widely used by 
researchers to study the level of transparency of firms (Lang & Lundholm, 1996, Patel, Balic, 
& Bwakira, 2002). 
The second stream of literature address corporate opaqueness through market perspectives and 
the information environment quality of outside investors. Following the definition of 
transparency (Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004), opaqueness is  defined to be the firm-
specific information unavailability to the capital market participants. Unlike the previous line 
of research which investigates opaqueness through transparency and information disclosure, 
this stream of literature examines corporate opaqueness by focusing on the quality of the 
information environment of capital market participants, including  outside investors and  
financial analysts (Aabo, Pantzalis, & Park, 2015, Anderson, Duru, & Reeb, 2009, Arping & 
Sautner, 2013, Duru, Wang, & Zhao, 2013, Ma, Ma, & Tian, 2017, Ravi & Hong, 2014, 
Upadhyay & Sriram, 2011, Upadhyay & Zeng, 2014).  
In this stream of literature, one line of research investigates firm opaqueness from the 
information environment of analysts. Previous research finds that the quality of the information 
environment of financial analysts and their forecasting accuracy reflect the level of corporate 
transparency and market expectations (Brown, 1996, Fried & Givoly, 1982, O'brien, 1988). 
Based on this, increasing analyst following which is indicated by increases in the number of 




of firms (Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 1995, Coller & Yohn, 1997, Dempsey, 1989, Hong, Lim, 
& Stein, 2000). Thus, based on the findings of previous studies, Arping and Sautner (2013) 
study corporate opaqueness by focusing on the information environment quality of analysts. 
By employing the quality of the information environment of analysts, the study finds that the 
corporate disclosures and governance reforms which are brought by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
section 404 significantly decrease the level of corporate opaqueness of firms. Following this, 
Pattnaik, Chang and Shin (2013) find that firms which are affiliated to business groups are 
more opaque compared to unaffiliated firms, since affiliated firms’ reliance on internal 
financing make them to be less likely to disclose information (Pattnaik, Chang, & Shin, 2013). 
Moreover, Ravi and Hong (2014) show that marginal increases in the corporate transparency 
of opaque firms lead to more severe inter-investor information friction among outside investors.  
Apart from the research which studies firm opaqueness and transparency through the lens of 
analysts, another line of research examines opaqueness through the market perspective. 
Anderson, Duru and Reeb (2009) examine the relationship between corporate founders and 
their ownership and firm opacity. In the study, firm opacity is studied through the dimensions 
of market information of firms. This study focuses on: 1) the founder and heir’s entrenchment 
effect which expropriate corporate wealth and 2) founder and heir’s monitoring effect which 
increases corporate performance. On the one hand, previous studies show that controlling and 
persistent shareholders such as the founder and the heir could extract firm resources and accrue 
their wealth by reducing  information disclosure and increasing firm opacity which is the 
entrenchment effect (Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2004, Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). On the 
other hand, opacity could also help the  founder and heir to continue their ownership and stay 
to address the agency problems through the monitoring effect because large and controlling 
shareholders have compelling incentives to monitor and regulate the behaviours of managers 




1986). The study shows that compared to more diffuse shareholder firms, founder and heir 
firms are associated with a larger degree of opacity. Moreover, by examining whether the 
founder/heir ownership and the associated corporate opacity affect the firm performance, the 
study further shows that there is a positive relationship between founder/heir ownership and 
company performance within the more transparent firms in the SP 500 and Fortune 500, 
suggesting that the monitoring effect plays a dominant role in the more transparent firms. In 
contrast, there is a negative relationship between founder/heir ownership and company 
performance in terms of less transparent firms, indicating that the entrenchment effect plays a 
dominant role in less transparent firms. Following this study, through employing similar ways 
to examine firm opacity, Upadhyay and Sriram (2011) find that board size is negatively related 
to the degree of firm opacity which indicates that investors perceive a larger board as able to 
provide more firm specific information which increases firm transparency. In another study, 
Upadhyay and Zeng (2014) show that board diversity which is indicated by gender and 
ethnicities is negatively associated with opacity, suggesting that increasing board diversity 
could improve the transparency of firms.  
Apart from this, Aabo, Pantzalis and Park (2015) investigate the relationship between firms’ 
multinationality and opaqueness. In this study, they define opaqueness as the quality of outside 
investors’ information environment. Specifically, three dimensions of opaqueness are studied, 
namely: stock price informativeness, analyst forecast accuracy and idiosyncratic risk. Aabo, 
Pantzalis and Park (2015) argue that increases in multinationality add to the degree of 
opaqueness of firms, due to the complex business operations and organizational structures 
which span across vast distances. Through using a similar approach to examine firm 
opaqueness, Durnev, Errunza and Molchanov (2009) examine how the degree of firm 
opaqueness affects firm growth and investment efficiency, with respect to countries with 




rights. This study finds that more transparent firms in countries with insecure protection of 
property rights are associated with worse investment efficiency and grow more slowly, due to 
the risks of government expropriation. 
In conclusion, so far in business literature, researchers examine opaqueness through the lens of 
transparency and disclosure and through the information environment of the capital market. In 
this study, I examine the issue of how firm opaqueness varies with degrees of hierarchical 
complexity which focuses on the information availability and information environment quality 
of outside investors. In this thesis, corporate opaqueness focuses the firm specific information 
accessibility to outside capital market participants. Therefore, based on previous literature, I 









































Chapter 3 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I firstly introduce the concept of organizational complexity so as to provide 
background knowledge on hierarchical complexity. Following this, I present the definition of 
hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness and introduce the firm level and country 
level moderators. Specifically, I include corporate diversification, quality of the home country 
institutional environment and host country institutional environment as moderators. 
In this section, I present the concepts of the three moderators. I also discuss the theoretical 
background as to why I use these three moderators. The corporate diversification of firms, 
quality of the home country institutional environment where firms are geographically located 
and quality of the host country institutional environment where the subsidiary companies 
operate businesses can influence the release and quality of firm specific information that is 
accessible to outside investors. This can affect the information environment quality of outside 
investors and firm opaqueness. I therefore include these three moderators in the study. 
Next, I present the hypotheses development of the thesis. In this section, I discuss the 
mechanisms of hierarchical complexity which lead to corporate opaqueness. Following this, in 
addition to the hypotheses development which focuses on whether and how hierarchical 
complexity is related to corporate opaqueness, I further examine the theoretical impact of firm 
level and country level moderators on the relationship between hierarchical complexity and 





3.2 Theoretical background 
3.2.1 Hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness 
In the study, I examine the relationship between hierarchical complexity and corporate 
opaqueness. Hierarchical complexity is one important dimension of organizational complexity. 
Organizational complexity is defined as the amount of diversities and differentiations that exist 
within different organizational functional units that constitute the organization (Dooley, 2002, 
Jablin, Putnam, Roberts, & Porter, 1987, Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967, Luhmann, 1995). The 
difficulties in coordinating these  functional units increase organizational complexity (Daft, 
2006, Scott & Meyer, 1994). In particular, an organization is complex if it has diversified 
functioning units and systems that operate in different categories. For example, the diversities 
of the different functional departments within the organization, the various roles and 
specializations of labour and the subsidiary companies could constitute organizational 
complexity. 
Hierarchical complexity is one important dimension of organizational complexity. In 
organization studies literature, given that complex organizations are comprised of functional 
systems and subsequent sub-level systems, Glenn and Malott (2004) define hierarchical 
complexity of the organization as the number of hierarchical and management levels which 
connect the organization’s functional systems and sub-level systems. In this definition, the 
functional systems refer to the various functional departments and operational labour 
specialisations of the organization whereas hierarchical levels are equivalent to the 
management levels of the organization.  
Based on the study of Glenn and Malott (2004) which considers hierarchical complexity 
through the lens of the number of hierarchical levels, in this thesis, I define hierarchical 




hierarchical levels and the associated subsequent complex hierarchical structures. Thus, in this 
study, hierarchical complexity of firms is determined by the number of subsidiary companies 
and the subsequent multiple hierarchical levels at which the subsidiary companies are located.  
The origins of the hierarchical complexity of firms are comprised of two issues. The first issue 
refers to the increasing number of subsidiary companies which can add to hierarchical 
complexity. Firms could have a number of subsidiaries which serve different business 
operational purposes primarily due to three categories of motivations: improving firm specific 
organizational efficiency, gaining international competitive advantages and increasing 
profitability (Cantwell, 1995, Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005, Chandler, 1990, Danneels, 2002, 
Dunning, 2000, Zey & Camp, 1996). For example, firms can allocate resources more efficiently 
and diversify risks by having subsidiary companies. Moreover, due to strategic development 
goals, firms can also have more subsidiary companies through undertaking mergers and 
acquisitions. Therefore, as the firm grows and expands its business, the firm can become 
hierarchically complex as it can add an increasing number of subsidiary companies which play 
critical roles in the firm’s business functions and operations. 
The second issue is that firms can organize the subsidiary companies in hierarchical ways and 
structures so as to transform firm competence and performance. Within the hierarchical 
structures, a different number of subsidiary companies are located at various hierarchical and 
management levels based on ownership relationships. Top management strategically plans and 
arranges product or service processing and manufacturing and organizes industry segments and 
geographical regions into different subsidiaries. Managers of subsidiary companies have their 
own control and decision-making rights. Subsidiaries are organized in hierarchical structures 
so as to address internal and external complexity thus improving firm specific efficiency 
(Anderson, 1999, Chandler, 1962, Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). As the firms grow and develop, 




firms, including complexity of product associated R&D and manufacturing technologies, 
complexity of administration and management and complexity of the sophisticated external 
environment conditions (Hobday, 1998, Mintzberg, 1979, Rosenberg, 1994, Sharp & 
Galimberti, 1993). As a result, in order to address the internal and external complexity, the 
firms develop hierarchy so as to cope with increasing complexity which arises both internally 
and externally and transforms performance. Specifically, hierarchical structures enable the firm 
to better allocate authority and communications. Managers of subsidiary companies can 
improve efficiency in coordinating product flows from production to distribution based on 
actual conditions of the local environment, while top management can strategically allocate 
resources and responsibilities among managers of subsidiary companies who are in charge of 
diverse business activities (Chandler, 1990, Zey & Camp, 1996). 
However, hierarchical complexity is then derived from the complex structures of the firms, and 
the degree of hierarchical complexity can get larger as the number of hierarchical levels of the 
firm increases. One important implication of hierarchical complexity is that high level 
management becomes increasingly unrelated to the contingencies of the lower levels as 
hierarchical complexity increases which disconnects the top management from subsidiaries 
(Glenn & Malott, 2004). Due to the increasing number of subsidiary companies, firms would 
require more management levels to take management responsibilities and such management 
levels also enable the subsidiaries to be connected at different hierarchical levels. In this case, 
increases in the number of subsidiary companies and the associated hierarchical levels add to 
hierarchical complexity. The concomitant hierarchical complexity thus increases disconnects 
between top management and subsidiary companies and results in inconsistency between tiers 
of the firm which adds significant difficulty for top management to control and coordinate the 




Therefore, hierarchical complexity can jeopardize the management efficiency and quality and 
threaten the organization’s success (Glenn & Malott, 2004, Scott & Meyer, 1994).  
Corporate opaqueness is defined to be the situation in which outside investors are not able to 
get effective access to the firm’s underlying economic situation in understandable ways 
through disclosure and reports (Barth & Schipper, 2008). Opaqueness happens when there is 
an insufficient amount of firm-specific information that is useful to outside investors for 
making investment decisions. This is the opposite side of corporate transparency (Bushman, 
Piotroski, & Smith, 2004). Corporate opaqueness is related to the ease with which information 
flows from the firm to outside investors in a timely manner. If the firms become more opaque, 
it is more difficult for outside investors to analyse and predict the firms’ performance and 
values. Opaqueness is important to the firms because it could affect the firms’ cost of capital, 
capital structures and investment policies (Barron, Sheng, & Thevenot, 2012, Durnev & 
Mangen, 2009, Francis, Nanda, & Olsson, 2008). 
3.2.2 Moderators: Corporate diversification and quality of the institutional 
environment 
In addition to the investigation of the relationship between hierarchical complexity and 
opaqueness, I also examine whether and how this relationship could be affected by firms’ 
corporate diversifications, quality of the home country institutional environment and host 
country institutional environment. 
First, as one important business characteristic of firms, corporate diversification has been 
empirically studied by scholars. Business researchers describe corporate diversification as the 
term that characterises the diversification of the firms’ industry and business segments (Palepu, 
1985). Corporate diversification refers to the situation where firms’ business scope expands to 




of the firms by providing details on the distribution of sales across a number of various industry 
segments. Prior literature has shown that the relationship between corporate diversification and 
firm transparency is controversial. In particular, the literature on corporate diversification 
provides conflicting predictions on how corporate diversification affects the level of 
information asymmetry between the firm and the outside investors on the capital market. One 
strand of literature offers some evidence for a positive relationship between corporate 
diversification and information asymmetry which documents that an increase in corporate 
diversification is related to a reduction of firms’ transparency. Specifically, from the outside 
investors’ information friction perspective, Nanda and Narayana (1999) show that corporate 
diversification can lead to information asymmetry between the firm and outsiders on the capital 
market (Nanda & Narayanan, 1999). They argue that the disaggregated information such as the 
unobservable information on firms’ cash flows of different industry segments and operational 
divisions cannot be accessible to outside investors due to corporate diversification since the 
outside investors only receive consolidated information,  selectively reported by the 
management, which may be less related to firms’ business operations and activities (Ataullah, 
Davidson, Le, & Wood, 2014, Krishnaswami & Subramaniam, 1999, Thomas, 2002). Duru 
and Reeb (2002) show that increasing corporate diversification is positively related to the use 
of incentive-based CEO compensation and greater reliance on market-based firm performance 
measures, instead of accounting-based measures. This is because increases in corporate 
diversification can lead to more severe information asymmetry between management and 
shareholders and thus more effective management incentive and monitoring mechanisms are 
required by the shareholders. Additionally, following similar arguments that increases in 
corporate diversification can be associated with a larger degree of information asymmetry 
between managers and shareholders, Bushman, Chen, Engel and Smith (2004) find that 




governance systems increase with the growth of corporate diversification.  This implies that 
corporate diversification is associated with moral hazard problems and the reduction of firm 
transparency. From the analyst forecasting perspective, Dunn and Nathan (1998) find that 
analyst forecasting accuracy is negatively associated with corporate diversification since the 
information complexity of diversified firms can add difficulty for  the analysts in processing 
and analysing the information of firms (Dunn & Nathan, 1998). 
However, another line of literature shows that the relationship between corporate 
diversification and firm transparency is not significant. In other words, corporate 
diversification might not necessarily lead to information asymmetry between the firms and 
outside investors. Thomas (2002) provides evidence that a larger degree of corporate 
diversification is not associated with increases in information asymmetry between the firm and 
outsiders which indicates that corporate diversification is not significantly related to firm 
transparency (Thomas, 2002). In another study, Clarke, Fee and Thomas (2004) show that on 
average, industry diversified firms are associated with less severe information asymmetry 
between the firm and outside investors. and  thus this study argues that corporate diversification 
is not on average related to an increase in information asymmetry and a reduction in  firm 
transparency (Clarke, Fee, & Thomas, 2004). According to the studies above, it is argued that 
diversification in industry and business segments can reduce the occurrence of forecasting 
errors of outsiders and provide more information sources to outsiders. Specifically, these 
authors argue that the outsiders’ errors in forecasting cash flows of each industry segment of 
diversified firms are imperfectly correlated and  thus the portfolio theory indicates that the 
absolute value of the percentage of errors in forecasting the firms’ cash flows may be smaller 
for diversified firms than for focused firms (Hadlock, Ryngaert, & Thomas, 2001). In this case, 
corporate diversification can help to reduce the analyst forecasting errors of the firms which 




Therefore, when firms are hierarchically complex, hierarchical complexity may hamper the 
quantity and quality of information obtained by outside investors. In such cases where firms 
become opaque to outside investors, the presence of corporate diversification of firms may 
influence the information environment quality of outside investors. This is because corporate 
diversification can affect the information availability and information processing difficulty of 
the firm management as well as the forecasting accuracy of the analysts which in turn 
influences the level of information accessibility of the outsiders. Thus, the level of firm 
opaqueness may vary with the interaction between hierarchical complexity and corporate 
diversification. Moreover, the investigation into the moderating effect of corporate 
diversification can also help to solve the existing controversies in the literature by indirectly 
examining the impact of corporate diversification on information asymmetry between the firms 
and outsiders.  
Second, the principle-agent problem can exist between the firms and the outsiders. The outside 
investors invest their money in the firm and they hope to gain investment returns but the 
outsiders do not directly participate in the firms’ management and business activities. Thus, 
the strategy and development goals of firms are not always in alignment with those of outside 
investors. The strategies of firms can deviate from or even conflict with the benefit of outside 
investors. In this case, firms have incentives to retain and expropriate the outsiders’ money and 
investment returns to gain development opportunities by sacrificing outside investors’ interest 
(Anderson, Duru, & Reeb, 2009, Jensen & Meckling, 1976, Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2004). 
Therefore, principle-agent problems can exist between the firms and outside investors due to 
the lack of goal convergence and a different division of labour (Lang & Lundholm, 2000). In 
hierarchically complex firms, hierarchical complexity can aggravate agency problems between 
the two parties by providing firms with more opportunities to act on self-interest seeking 




investors and shareholders. This is because due to the corporations’ complex operations and 
organizational structures, it could be difficult for outside investors to gain an adequate and 
sufficient amount of firm-specific information. This  masks firm activities and aggravates 
agency conflicts between the firms and outsiders (Callen, Hope, & Segal, 2005, Doukas & 
Pantzalis, 2003, Duru & Reeb, 2002, Hope & Thomas, 2008, Huang, 2012). Therefore, 
institutional rules and institutional environment regulations may influence agency conflicts and 
the degree of firm opaqueness between the firm and outside investors. Strong policies, legal 
enforcement and effective regulations from the external institutional environment can rule and 
discipline the behaviours of the firms and the subsidiary companies by increasing the costs and 
difficulty involved for the firms to undertake expropriation behaviours (La Porta, Lopez‐de‐
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). Thus, improving the quality of the institutional environment 
can counteract the impact of hierarchical complexity on corporate opaqueness and function as 
a moderator on the relationship between firms’ hierarchical complexity and corporate 
opaqueness.  
Therefore, in this thesis, inspired by previous studies which examine the impact of corporate 
diversification on information asymmetry and firm transparency, while I do not directly 
examine the impact of corporate diversification on firm transparency, I include firms’ corporate 
diversification as the moderating factor and examine the moderating effects of corporate 
diversification on the relationship between hierarchical complexity and firm opaqueness. 
Following this, I investigate the moderating impact of the home country institutional 
environment quality and the host country institutional environment quality on the relationship 





3.3 Hypotheses development  
Hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness 
The channels through which hierarchical complexity leads to opaqueness have two components, 
with the first component consisting of two issues. The first issue stands for the disconnections 
and unrelatedness which are derived from hierarchical complexity between top management 
and subsidiary companies, while the second issue refers to the reduced quantity and quality of 
communications between the firms and outsiders. The second component indicates the 
information friction between the firm and outside investors which is derived from the affiliated 
companies (i.e. subsidiaries of subsidiary companies) of the firms. 
In regard to the first component, hierarchical complexity could cause disconnections and 
unrelatedness between top management and the subsidiary companies. In particular, 
disconnections refer to the situation where the top management of the parent company is not 
effectively connected to the business operations of the subsidiary companies which hampers 
the information flows between the parent company and subsidiary companies. Unrelatedness 
indicates the situation when the information flows between the parent company and subsidiary 
companies can be incomplete or even distorted. The hierarchical complexity and the resulting 
disconnections subsequently increase the difficulty and costs for the top management of the 
parent company to obtain sufficient information on firm operation and performance which 
consequently reduce the quality and quantity of the communications between the firm and the 
outside market. Thus, corporate opaqueness is derived from the outside investors’ 
inaccessibility to firm information and their lack of clarity regarding firms’ activities and 
performance.  
Specifically, the first issue is that hierarchical complexity could prevent top management from 




The increases in the hierarchical levels add to management distance between headquarters and 
subsidiary companies and thus a larger degree of hierarchical complexity can make 
management at the parent company be increasingly unrelated to management at the subsidiary 
companies. As a result, such disconnections weaken the linkage between top management and 
subsidiary companies which makes it difficult for top management to obtain sufficient and 
comprehensive information on the firm’s operations. Hierarchical complexity and the 
subsequent disconnections make the reporting and provision of information to top management 
become costly, since the efficiency and accuracy of information reporting can  be less  as a 
result of   the firms’ complex hierarchical and management structures (Christie, Joye, & Watts, 
2003, Dikolli & Vaysman, 2006). Thus, hierarchical complexity jeopardizes the information 
flows between the subsidiary companies and the parent company. Consequently, it could 
become difficult for top management to be well informed about the firm’s operations. 
Moreover, through years of experience, some subsidiary companies may have gained relative 
independence and autonomy due to their resources and competitive advantages (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 2002, Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990, Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991, Hedlund, 1994). 
Consequently, the relative independence of the subsidiary companies enables them to be able 
to restrict the quantity and quality of information that is reported to the top management of the 
parent company, since the management of subsidiaries may distort information so as to pursue 
self-interests or mask business performance (Dikolli & Vaysman, 2006). Therefore, a higher 
degree of hierarchical complexity could increase the difficulty and cost for the top management 
to obtain sufficient information on the firms that are connected to the parent company through 
a chain of ownership linkages.  
The second issue is that top management’s insufficient information availability which is due to 
hierarchical complexity can decrease communications between the firm and outside investors 




opaqueness. First, the management’s insufficient information availability hampers the top 
management’s capability to comprehensively analyse the firm and its operations, since top 
managers must gather and process adequate information and data so as to understand, analyse 
and control the firm. Second, although managers may intentionally and selectively release 
fractions of firm information in the annual report under the allowance of current accounting 
standards (Bushman, Chen, Engel, & Smith, 2004, Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, & Sohail, 2006, 
Jennings, Seo, & Tanlu, 2014), the reduced quantity of information obtained and analysed by 
the management due to increases in hierarchical complexity can cause managers to disclose an 
even less amount of useful firm-specific information to the external market participants 
because managers themselves do not have much information (e.g., about the firms’ and the 
subsidiary companies’) to disclose (Jennings, Seo, & Tanlu, 2014). Consequently,  top 
management’s insufficient information availability reduces the quality of the firms’ financial 
statements and accuracy of management forecasting behaviours which decreases the values of 
annual reports and firm disclosures (Dye, 1985, Jennings, Seo, & Tanlu, 2014, Jung & Kwon, 
1988). Thus, hierarchical complexity finally diminishes the quality and effectiveness of 
managers’ communication with external market participants. As a result, the decreased 
communications between management and outside investors reduce the amount and 
informativeness of firm-specific information that is released to the outside market participants 
which makes it more difficult for outside investors to get access to firm information and 
understand firm performance and operations. Although some analysts might have their own 
private ways to obtain firm information, the annual reports and financial statements released 
by the firms are the primary sources for outside investors and analysts to gain firm specific 
information but despite that it is not possible for investors to access the complete and total 




for outside investors to obtain a sufficient amount of information about the firms. Thus, 
opaqueness increases as firms become more hierarchically complex. 
Apart from this, hierarchical complexity can also make firms become opaque because of the 
regulatory barriers which are derived from the firms’ affiliated companies. Under the 
requirements and regulatory standards of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
firms should disclose firm-specific information in the consolidated financial statements which 
combine financial information of both the parent company and its subsidiary companies. In 
particular, firms are required by the SEC to disclose information on subsidiaries under Item 
601 of Regulation S-K. However, the SEC does not require firms to disclose information of 
affiliated companies in which the firms do not have a majority stake. In this case, the financial 
statements and annual reports of the firms do not include or reflect information on the activities 
and performance of the affiliated companies. As a result, it can be difficult for outside analysts 
and investors to access comprehensive firm-specific information due to the regulatory barriers, 
as well as the information friction of affiliated companies which are located at longer distances 
in the chain of ownership linkages. Consequently, the firms can become more opaque and less 
transparent. 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between firms’ hierarchical complexity and 
corporate opaqueness. 
Firms’ corporate diversification 
Corporate diversification refers to the situation where the firm operates in more than one 
industry sector. Firms’ corporate diversification includes related corporate diversification and 
unrelated corporate diversification. Related corporate diversification stands for the situation 
where the firms’ diversified industry segments share similar resources such as similar assets, 




unrelated corporate diversification indicates the condition when the firms’ diversified industry 
segments’ resources such as product manufacturing and categories are different to each other. 
Both related and unrelated corporate diversification can influence the relationship between 
hierarchical complexity and opaqueness.  
First, the related corporate diversification of firms can improve top management’s information 
disclosure capability by reducing management’s difficulty in processing and analysing 
information on firm activities and operations. Firms with related corporate diversifications can 
have divisions and subsidiary companies operate in industry segments that share similarities. 
When firms have divisions and subsidiary companies operating in related industry segments, 
the firms’ scope of products and the market situations of the subsidiary companies share 
relevant characteristics, since the firms can allocate similar technologies and managerial 
capabilities to the related industry segments (Nayyar, 1993). Thus, the information which is 
required to understand and analyse the operations of the firm and subsidiary companies is 
homogeneous.  
In particular, information on the divisions and subsidiary companies which operate in one 
industry segment could span over more than one industry because operating and business 
information on the scope of products and resources, as well as the associated business and 
market conditions of the related industry segments, can have a high degree of  commonality  
(Breschi, Lissoni, & Malerba, 2003, Teece, 1982). Moreover, managers of firms which have a 
related corporate diversification process and analyse information from a lower number of 
sources with less varieties   simplify  the procedures to process information and data and 
improve efficiency (Jennings, Seo, & Tanlu, 2014). As a result, firms’ related corporate 
diversification and the associated lack of variety of the industry segments where subsidiary 
companies operate could reduce the cost and difficulty for top management to process and 




Therefore, related corporate diversification effectively improves top management’s capability 
to know and understand the firm operations which enhances the accuracy of management 
forecasting behaviours and improves information disclosure quality. In this case, the benefits 
of information synergies brought by related corporate diversification partly offset the 
information insufficiency resulting from hierarchical complexity. Thus, related corporate 
diversification can mitigate the relationship between hierarchical complexity and the 
opaqueness of firms.  
Second, unrelated corporate diversification could strengthen the relationship between 
hierarchical complexity and opaqueness by aggravating management’s difficulty in processing 
information and analysing the operations of the firm. In contrast to management’s reduced 
difficulty in processing and analysing firm information due to related corporate diversification, 
unrelated corporate diversification exacerbates such difficulty. In firms that have corporate 
diversification, the success of the firms relies on the top management’s capability to manage a 
wide range of opportunities and risk brought by corporate diversifications. When firms operate 
businesses in a number of different and unrelated industry segments, the different and unrelated 
industry segments can increase the difficulty for top management to process and analyse 
information. This is because the varieties and differentiations of the firms’ business scopes can 
add a number of different information sources to  management which can hamper the 
information processing capabilities of managers from the parent company (March & Simon, 
1958). In firms that operate business in unrelated industry segments, the industry segments of 
the firms are different and may share less synergies with each other.   Thus, the differentiations 
among unrelated industry segments require that top management has specialised information 
on each industry division so as to analyse firm operations in various industries. Hence, the 
specialised information from various sources adds cognitive challenges such as information 




Moreover, the processing and analysis of information on the operations of subsidiary 
companies from particular industries requires understanding of local business conditions and 
environments. Such information needs to be gained through years of experience and cannot be 
easily transferred with technological methods (Christie, Joye, & Watts, 2003). As a result, top 
management of hierarchically complex firms which are engaged in unrelated corporate 
diversification faces greater challenges and costs to collect, aggregate and process information 
and data which reflect business activities and performance of the companies from various 
unrelated industry segments (Bushman, Chen, Engel, & Smith, 2004, Jennings, Seo, & Tanlu, 
2014, Scott, 2015). Therefore, the firms’ complex business operations which stretch over a 
number of different unrelated industry segments add to the impact of hierarchical complexity 
on opaqueness and are perceived to be less transparent. 
Third, related corporate diversification and unrelated corporate diversification can affect the 
forecasting accuracy and predicting capabilities of financial analysts differently which in turn, 
affects the relationship between hierarchical complexity and opaqueness differently. 
Specifically, when the firm has corporate diversifications in related industry segments, analysts 
following the firm can apply a significant proportion of information and expert knowledge of 
one industry segment to another and  thus analysts can collect, process and analyse information 
in terms of the firm’s industry segments simultaneously (Bhushan, 1989, Dunn & Nathan, 
2005). Therefore, related corporate diversification can reduce the difficulties for analysts to 
analyse firm activities and forecast firm performance. However, analysts can face greater 
difficulty and complications in terms of firms which diversify in unrelated industry segments. 
Firms with unrelated corporate diversification have business and industry segments from a 
number of different and unrelated industries while individual analysts often specialise within 




exceed the analysts’ areas of expertise at least along some dimensions (Clarke, Fee, & Thomas, 
2004, Thomas, 2002).  
Moreover, when following firms with unrelated corporate diversification, analysts have to 
become familiar with the information and data from multiple industry segments separately 
which adds greater difficulty and complications for analysts. (Dunn & Nathan, 2005). 
Therefore, related corporate diversifications can reduce the difficulty faced by analysts and 
increase forecasting accuracy which provides a relatively larger amount of useful information 
to outside investors and alleviates the level of firm opaqueness. In contrast, unrelated corporate 
diversifications can reduce the forecasting accuracy and weaken the predicting capabilities of 
analysts which increases the level of firm opaqueness.    
Hypothesis 2a: Increases in related corporate diversification weaken the relationship between 
firms’ hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness. 
Hypothesis 2b: Increases in unrelated corporate diversification strengthen the relationship 
between firms’ hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness. 
Home country institutional environment 
Firms develop and operate in states with different institutional environments with some states 
having stricter institutional policies and better institutional environments. However, due to 
various factors such as remote geographical locations and different economic development 
levels, the quality of institutional environments may vary across states. The federal state’s 
institutional environment could influence the linkage between hierarchical complexity and 
opaqueness by affecting agency conflicts between the firm and outside investors.  
The moderating effect of the quality of institutional environment on the relationship between 
hierarchical complexity and opaqueness has two key components. The first component is that 




transparency and protect the outside investors’ rights and benefits, for example, state 
governments establish obligatory regulation policies and laws which promote corporate 
transparency, including advancing auditor independence and actively encouraging firms to 
improve information disclosures. 
The second component is that improved quality of the state institutional environment could 
affect the degree of opaqueness by alleviating agency conflict between the firm and outside 
investors. A higher quality of the institutional environment where firms are located can reduce 
the degree of opaqueness by influencing firms to consider more fully   the mutual benefit which 
exists between firms and outside investors. During the growth periods and development process 
of firms, the institutional environment stipulates social, political and legal rules that regulate 
the behaviours of the firms. In other words, firms operate on the ground and basis set by the 
institutional environment (Davis, North, & Smorodin, 1971). This institutional environment is 
comprised of both formal and informal regulations. Formal regulations refer to the constraints 
from political and legal rules, while informal regulations consist of codes of conduct, moral 
standard of behaviours and traditional outlooks on value that are included in the culture and 
ideology of the society (North, 1990). Both the formal and informal regulations set obligatory 
rules for firms and firms operate and develop by adhering  to these rules and interacting with 
them (Hillman & Keim, 1995). In the states that have relatively more strict institutional rules 
and policies, firms are assumed to be more or less influenced to follow the obligatory rules set 
by the institutional environment. Similar to the growth from childhood of human beings, the 
influence from the institutional environment lasts for the entire time span and development 
process of the firms’ growth from establishment. As a result, firms which are located in states 
with an improved institutional environment quality are more likely to have the potential to 
increase the quality and quantity of firm-specific information disclosures and adjust the degree 




account when making business decisions and strategic choices. In addition, such a mutual 
relationship would also benefit the firms by reducing their costs of capital and optimising their 
equity structures. As a result, the level of outside investors’ information inaccessibility and 
agency conflict between the firm and outside investors could be alleviated due to the 
imperceptible regulations and influence imposed by a better quality of the institutional 
environment. Therefore, increasing the quality of the institutional environment where firms are 
located could negatively moderate the relationship between hierarchical complexity and 
opaqueness. 
Hypothesis 3: Increases in the quality of the home country institutional environment mitigate 
the relationship between firms’ hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness. 
Host country institutional environment 
With corporate growth and business expansions, some hierarchically complex firms have 
subsidiary companies operating in different countries. Firms expand business overseas so as to 
utilize location advantages and gain competitive advantages, such as accessing strategic assets, 
exploiting local resources, reducing manufacturing costs and expanding their  markets (Coase, 
1937, Dunning, 2000, Dunning, 1988, Geringer, Tallman, & Olsen, 2000, Rugman, 1981, 
Rugman & Verbeke, 2001, Williamson, 1979). In order to gain such advantages and strengthen 
competency, firms can establish subsidiary companies overseas. The subsidiary companies 
conduct business in different countries with diversified economic development levels and 
cultures and thus the quality of the institutional environment of the host countries where 
subsidiaries operate varies. For firms which have subsidiary companies operating in host 
countries with strict regulation policies and law enforcement, a high-quality host country 
institutional environment could mitigate the relationship between hierarchical complexity and 




First, strict institutional regulations and rules of the host country are necessary to regulate and 
discipline the degree of opaqueness of firms derived from hierarchical complexity. When firms 
have subsidiaries located in a number of countries, firms can have more complex hierarchical 
structures. As a result, firms can use the complex hierarchical structures of subsidiaries to 
undertake related party transactions between the parent company and foreign subsidiaries as 
well as among subsidiaries.  
Related party transactions mean the business deals and arrangements which are made between 
two related parties. Some of the related party transactions are developed in accordance with the 
firms’ development strategies, while there are also some related party transactions which are 
performed to expropriate the wealth of investors. Although accounting standards and 
monitoring mechanisms exist to discipline related party transactions, these mechanisms do not 
eliminate related party transactions, since related party transactions can be part of contracting 
between the firm and subsidiary companies and firms may enter into but do not disclose the 
related party transactions (Kohlbeck & Mayhew, 2010, Kohlbeck & Mayhew, 2004). In this 
case, hierarchically complex firms could maliciously transfer wealth and hide and distort 
financial information by performing related party transactions at the expense of investors’ 
benefits (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
& Shleifer, 2006, Nekhili & Cherif, 2011). The most direct consequence of fraudulent related 
party transactions is that executives can enrich themselves and generate misleading financial 
statements. This can jeopardize firms’ transparency and make firms become more opaque. For 
example, the parent company and subsidiaries could fraudulently transfer funds to each other 
so as to distort and mask financial information and performance. The distorted and false 
financial and accounting information can be misleading to outside investors when they analyse 




Among related party transactions, foreign subsidiary companies play important roles in 
enabling the firms to undertake such frauds. Hierarchically complex firms with subsidiary 
companies allocated at various geographical regions and the associated information asymmetry 
provide subsidiaries with capabilities and opportunities to undertake such fraudulent 
behaviours. This is due to investors’ information inaccessibility to foreign subsidiary 
companies and home country regulating authorities’ lack of monitoring of behaviours of 
foreign subsidiary companies which result from the firms’ complex hierarchical structures. 
Therefore, strict institutional regulation rules and policies of the host countries are required to 
discipline the behaviours of firms and the foreign subsidiary companies. 
Second, increasing the quality of the host country institutional environment can affect the level 
of opaqueness by regulating the behaviours of local subsidiary companies. The development 
of the host country institutional quality, particularly the regulating authorities and legal systems, 
plays a critical role in ruling the behaviours of local subsidiaries and reducing the occurrence 
of fraudulent related party transactions. By applying strict and comprehensive accounting and 
auditing standards, strict regulatory policies and powerful legal enforcement systems of the 
host countries help to increase the subsidiary companies’ accounting information reliability 
and financial transparency. The local subsidiaries are required to report reliable and true 
financial statements and information on business operations. Thus, for those subsidiary 
companies which are involved in fraudulent related party transactions, more strict regulatory 
standards effectively reduce the opportunities for them to participate in such related party 
transactions (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). Moreover, improvement 
and adoption of regulations and reinforced law enforcement make the fraudulent behaviours 
difficult to apply. In such cases, firms and the subsidiary companies would have to go through 
more distorted and complicated ways to undertake such behaviours. For example, under 




companies so as to use fraudulent related party transactions to enrich the firm, which could 
take up a remarkable amount of time and capital resources and tend to be efficiency wasteful 
(Shleifer, Vishny, La Porta, & Lopez-de-Silanes, 2000). As a result, increasing the quality of 
the host country institutions where strict regulation policy and law enforcement powers apply 
could effectively regulate the behaviours of the firms and the subsidiary companies and 
subsequently force the parent firm to provide more reliable financial statements and disclose 
greater amount of accurate information. Thus, improvement of host country institutions 
increases corporate transparency and reduces corporate opaqueness which is due to hierarchical 
complexity.  
Hypothesis 4: Increases in the quality of the host country institutional environment weaken the 






































Chapter 4 Methods 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I present the empirical strategy for testing my hypotheses. First, I describe the 
databases used for this study. Second, I specify the measurements for the dependent, 
independent and control variables which are included in the baseline model. Following this, I 
then introduce the measurements for the moderating variables which include firms’ related 
corporate diversifications, unrelated corporate diversifications, quality of the home country 
institutional environment and host country institutional environment. I will formally test 
whether they moderate the relationship between hierarchical complexity and corporate 
opaqueness in the next chapter. Lastly, I specify the empirical models as well as the empirical 
strategies to address potential endogeneity bias. 
 
4.2 Data 
In this study, I employ data from U.S. companies to test my hypotheses. U.S. companies are 
especially appropriate for studying the relationship between hierarchical complexity and 
opaqueness of firms because US companies account for a large share of the world’s firms that 
have complex hierarchical structures and business operations, some of which may spread over 
several world regions. Thus, they present an ideal context for the study of hierarchical 
complexity and opaqueness. 
The sample includes the universe of firms listed on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX, which are 
the largest stock exchange markets of the United States. The sample period is from 2012 to 
2016, inclusive. I require that firms have information on subsidiaries which I use to construct 
the measure of hierarchical complexity. I draw on the Bureau van Dijk (BvD) database, which 




databases to obtain the daily stock data of firms and the analyst data which I use to construct 
the corporate opaqueness variables. I use the Compustat database to obtain firms’ financial and 
accounting data. I refer to the US Census Bureau and US Department of Labour database to 
collect the data that is used to construct the home country, federal state institutional 
environment variables. The data on the host country institutional environment is obtained from 
the World Bank databases. In the sample, the original number of firms from the Compustat 
fundamentals annual database is 7041 but I drop firms that are from financials, public utilities 
and firms with unclear industry classifications. Financial firms have different financial 
structures and public utilities are highly regulated.  Moreover, I also drop firms with missing 
SIC codes, missing BvD database identification numbers and missing Central Index Key (CIK) 
numbers. After processing the duplicates of firms within the databases and merging different 
databases, the final sample includes 1,667 firms with 8,335 firm-year observations covering 
the 5 year period from 2012 to 2016. 
 
4.3 Measures 
4.3.1 Dependent Variables 
Opaqueness index. The dependent variable, opaqueness, refers to the firm-specific information 
unavailability to  outside investors (Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004). Based on previous 
studies (Duru, Wang, & Zhao, 2013, Upadhyay & Sriram, 2011, Upadhyay & Zeng, 2014), I 
measure corporate opaqueness by an index which ranks the opacity or transparency of each 
firm in the sample. The opaqueness index is comprised of three components which are the 
share turnover of the firms’ stock, the bid-ask spread and the number of analysts following. 
The share turnover and bid-ask spread belong to the category of the information environment 




by the outstanding shares of one fiscal year. The bid-ask spread is measured by the mean daily 
bid-ask spread of the fiscal year. In addition to the category of the capital market information 
environment, the opaqueness index is also complemented by the category of capital market 
intermediaries, the analyst following. The analyst following is obtained through the mean 
number of analysts following one firm within the fiscal year.  
After computing the values of the three components, in order to construct the corporate 
opaqueness index, following Anderson, Duru and Reeb (2009) and Duru, Wang and Zhao 
(2013), I rank each of the three components into deciles. In each component, I assign the point 
value from 1 to 10 to each firm:  the value 10 indicates the highest level of opaqueness and the 
value 1 means the lowest level of opaqueness. Then each firm in the sample is assigned with 
points of value from all three components. The comprehensive and robust opaqueness index is 
then computed as the sum of assigned points of value of each firm divided by 30, which is the 
total possible points from the three components. As a result, the opaqueness index ranges from 
0.1 to 1 with the larger value indicating a higher level of opaqueness. 
Information transparency. Following Aabo, Pantzalis and Park (2015) and Durnev, Errunza 
and Molchanov (2009), I also proxy corporate opaqueness using the information transparency 
of firms so as to provide a more comprehensive examination of the linkage between 
hierarchical complexity and opaqueness. Information transparency measures the degree of 
stock price synchronicity (Morck, Yeung, & Yu, 2000). Specifically, if the firms’ stock returns 
move more asynchronously with the market returns, then the stock returns would contain a 
greater  amount of firm-specific information which could be reflected in the stock prices 
(Durnev, Errunza, & Molchanov, 2009). In this case, the increases of firm-specific information 
accessibility would make firms be less opaque and more transparent to outside investors. The 





In the model, I regress stock returns of firms on the returns of the market index. γi,w,t is the 
excess return for stock i in week w in year t, γm,w,t is the value-weighted excess return of the 
US stock market index in week w in year t. I use weekly data instead of monthly data and daily 
data because the number of monthly observations might be small and  in addition, weekly data 
can  also avoid the problem of non-trading observations which are  derived from using daily 
data (Conrad & Kaul, 1988). Following the study of Durnev, Errunza and Molchanov (2009), 
I use the logarithmic transformation of coefficient of determination which is obtained from the 
regressions above to measure firms’ information transparency: 
Information transparency= ln⁡[(1 − 𝑅2) 𝑅2]⁄ ,    
where R2 means the values of the coefficient of determination which is obtained from the 
market model regressions. Lower values of information transparency indicate that firms’ stock 
returns move more synchronously with market stock returns and thus firm-specific information 
is less accessible to outside investors. Therefore, lower values of information transparency are 
associated with high corporate opaqueness. 
Moreover, Aabo, Pantzalis and Park (2015) use the values of idiosyncratic risk of firms which 
are obtained from the market model regressions to proxy corporate opaqueness and they argue 
that increases in opaqueness could be indicated by lower values of idiosyncratic risks and 
higher values of R2. Thus, in this thesis, I use firms’ idiosyncratic risks as another measurement 
for opaqueness in the robustness test to further examine the linkage between hierarchical 
complexity and opaqueness. For robustness tests purposes, I obtain the idiosyncratic risk by 
calculating the log of residuals’ variance from the regression model above. Lower value of 




4.3.2 Independent Variables 
Hierarchical complexity. Hierarchical complexity is the independent variable in the model. 
Hierarchical complexity reflects the degree of complexity of the firm’s subsidiary structures. 
In hierarchically complex companies, the headquarter company owns many subsidiary 
companies. One or more subsidiary companies may subsequently own a number of subsidiaries. 
In some cases, one subsidiary may be owned by one or more higher level companies. Here I 
use a hierarchical complexity graph tree below to better illustrate this. 









In the graph above, the parent company of the firm owns two subsidiaries which are located at 
hierarchical level 1, subsidiary company 1 subsequently owns two subsidiary companies, 
subsidiary company 3 and subsidiary company 4 which are located at hierarchical level 2, while 
the second subsidiary is co-owned by subsidiary company 2 at the same time. Following this, 
subsidiary company 3 and subsidiary company 4 in turn have two subsidiary companies at 
hierarchical level 3.  
Headquarter of the firm (Level 0) 
Subsidiary company 1 (Level 1) Subsidiary company 2 (Level 1) 
 
Subsidiary company 3 (Level 2) 
 
Subsidiary company 4 (Level 2) 
 
Subsidiary company 5 (Level 3) 
 





The subsidiary companies are located at different hierarchical levels which are determined by 
different ownership and control relationships. Therefore, it is appropriate for us to assume that 
the firm can have a total of L levels with a varied number of subsidiaries located at different 
levels. Specifically, the headquarter company is at level 0 of the hierarchy, with a different 
number of subsidiary companies located at 1, 2, 3…l…L levels. In this case, the hierarchical 
structure of the firm’s subsidiaries is analogous to the hierarchical graph of mathematics.  
Based on mathematical graph theory, in the hierarchical graph, each subsidiary company could 
be represented as the nodes or vertices, the ownership and control relationships between 
headquarter and subsidiaries. In addition, the control relationships among subsidiary 
companies could be represented as the edges that connect the nodes.  
Among numerous graphs from mathematics, the hierarchical graph is the most suitable to 
capture the hierarchical structure and complexity of firms. This is because hierarchical graphs 
allow ultimate nodes and vertices at lower hierarchical levels to be directly or indirectly 
connected by nodes at higher levels which is equivalent to the case when the subsidiary is 
owned by one or more companies at higher hierarchical levels. In addition, hierarchical graphs 
allow the parent node at the highest hierarchical level to be able to connect and control other 
nodes at lower hierarchical levels which is analogous to the case when the headquarter 
company controls and coordinates lower level subsidiaries (Altomonte & Rungi, 2013, 
Brandstadt & Spinrad, 1999, Emmert-Streib & Dehmer, 2007). Thus, the hierarchical 
structures and complexity of firms can be well represented by the hierarchical graph.  
Following Altomonte and Rungi (2013), based on the measures and computations from graph 
theory (Emmert-Streib & Dehmer, 2007), I calculate the hierarchical complexity of firms by 
using node entropy as follows : 










In the equation above, l represents the given hierarchical level, nl stands for the number of 
subsidiary companies at each hierarchical level l; N and L indicate the total number of 
subsidiary companies and the total number of hierarchical levels of the firms, respectively. In 
the equation, we multiply the product of nl/N and log (N/nl) with l so as to be able to sum up 
the hierarchical complexity at each sub-hierarchical level. 
Thus, hierarchical complexity is the function of the number of subsidiary companies at each 
hierarchical level, the hierarchical level and the total number of subsidiary companies of the 
firms. The measure of hierarchical complexity is continuous and it ranges from zero to infinity, 
mathematically and theoretically. If the firm has one level of subsidiary companies that are 
controlled by headquarters, then hierarchical complexity is equal to zero. In addition, it is 
additive in L. 
Here I further demonstrate how the degree of hierarchical complexity of firms evolves as the 
number of subsidiary companies at each hierarchical level and the total number of hierarchical 
levels increase. It can be seen from the formula above that the value of hierarchical complexity 
is determined by the summation of the current Lth level and all previous (L-1) levels and thus 
for illustration purposes, I assume that the firm has a total number of 10 hierarchical levels, 
with 1 subsidiary company at level 1, 2 subsidiaries at level 2, 3 subsidiaries at level 3… and 
10 subsidiaries at level 10. Then I calculate the value of hierarchical complexity at each 
hierarchical level by assuming that the hierarchical level used in each calculation is the largest 









Table 4.1. Hierarchical complexity changes 
Hierarchical level Hierarchical complexity Determination elements 
1 0.07 (1,1) 
2 0.31 (2,2,1) 
3 0.78 (3,3,2,1) 
4 1.55 (4,4,3,2,1) 
5 2.64 (5,5,4,3,2,1) 
6 4.09 (6,6,5,4,3,2,1) 
7 5.92 (7,7,6,5,4,3,2,1) 
8 8.17 (8,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1) 
9 10.83 (9,9,9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1) 
10 13.93 (10,10, 9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1) 
   
In the table above, the left column includes the hierarchical levels of the firm. The middle 
column displays the values of hierarchical complexity. The right column uses 1× (L+1) 
dimension matrix to demonstrate elements which determine hierarchical complexity which are 
the hierarchical levels and the number of subsidiaries at each hierarchical level. Within each 
matrix, element a1, 1 is the Lth hierarchical level which is included in the calculation while 
elements a1, 2 through a1, 11 are the number of subsidiaries at each hierarchical level. 
4.3.3 Moderators 
Related corporate diversification entropy.  
Firms’ related corporate diversification entropy reflects the scope of the firms’ related industry 
segments. I use the value of firms’ net sales from the Compustat database which covers all 
sample firms to calculate the values of the entropy variable. Larger scores on the related 




corporate diversifications. Based on the studies of Jacquemin and Berry (1979) and Palepu 
(1985), the related corporate diversification entropy is calculated as the following: 
First, assuming that the firm operates in 1, 2…j…N related industry groups, related corporate 
diversification entropy of the jth industry group is calculated based on the percentage of sales 
of ith segment in the jth industry group: 
DRj=∑ 𝑃(𝑖, 𝑗) ∗ ln⁡(
1
𝑃(𝑖,𝑗)
)𝑖,𝑗 , where P(i,j) represents the percentage of sales of ith segment in the 
jth industry group.  
Thus, 
DR=∑ 𝑃𝑗 ∗ 𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑁𝑗=1  
In the equation, DR on the left-hand side represents the firm’s related corporate diversification 
entropy, Pj stands for the percentage of sales of the jth industry group in the total N industry 
groups, DRj on the right-hand side is the related corporate diversifications of the jth industry 
group. 
In the calculations above, the industry is defined by the primary Standard Industrial 
Classification code (SIC). I use the four-digit SIC code to identify similar and different 
segments that belongs to a particular industry group. I use the two-digit SIC code to identify 
similar and different industry groups. 
Unrelated corporate diversification entropy. 
Firms’ unrelated corporate diversification entropy reflects firms’ business and operation scopes 
across unrelated industry segments. Unrelated industry segments are defined to be industries 
with different two-digit SIC codes. When the firm operates across 1, 2…j…M unrelated 




DU=∑ 𝑃𝑗 ∗ ln⁡(
1
𝑃𝑗
)𝑀𝑗=1 ,  
where DU is the unrelated corporate diversifications, Pj represents sales in the jth industry 
segment. 
Home country institutional environment.  
The home country institutional environment refers to the US federal state institutional 
environment where the firms’ parent companies are geographically located. The institutional 
environment is comprised of sets of rules and standards which regulate the behaviours of 
economic entities. Improved formal and informal regulations can  influence and shape the firms’ 
development strategies (Hillman & Keim, 1995) and hence improve firms’ disclosure quality 
and moderate firms’ opaqueness. In this context, states with strong accounting and auditing 
professions, financial examiners and analyst professions and legal enforcement systems would 
be associated with the development of a more rigorous and stricter institutional environment. 
Following Ding, Hope, Jeanjean and Stolowy (2007), I use the density of accounting and 
auditing professionals, finance examiners and financial analyst professionals and legal 
occupations, which include lawyers and legislators, to proxy the quality of the home country 
institutional environment (Ding, Hope, Jeanjean, & Stolowy, 2007). Thus, the value of the 
home country institutional environment is measured by the total number of the state’s 
accounting and auditing professionals, finance examiners and financial analyst professionals 
and legal professionals, scaled by the total number of firms that are geographically located in 
that state. This measure avoids the confusion arising from companies of one state being 
registered in another geographically different state. Higher values of the home country 
institutional environment variable indicate increasing quality of the home country institutional 





Host country institutional environment.  
Firms can own subsidiary companies in different countries. Stricter investor protection policies, 
strengthened legal systems and law enforcement mechanisms in the host countries could help 
to increase and improve the amount and quality of firms’ information absorbed by outside 
investors which helps to protect the rights and benefits of outside investors (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2006, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). Thus, the 
institutional environment of host countries could moderate the level of opaqueness of firms. I 
measure the quality of the host country institutional environment as follows: 
Host country institutional environment =∑ 𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡⁡𝑛𝑖=1  
In the equations above, 𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 is the subsidiary’s share of the firm’s total assets which is 
measured as the value of the subsidiary’s total assets divided by the firm’s total assets. The 
letter “i” indicates the value of the ith subsidiary, letter “t” means the year. COUNTRYit means 
the value of the quality of the host country’s institutional environment at year t where the ith 
subsidiary operates. Following Lu, Liu, Wright and Filatotchev (2014), among the six 
dimensions of the World Governance Indicators constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2009), I calculate the country governance indicator by computing the mean value 
of the host country’s Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality Estimate, Rule of Law and Control of 
Corruption. The data is provided by the World Bank database. I use the country governance 
indicator values to measure the institutional environment quality of the host countries because 
it captures and reflects the soundness and importance of the host country’s policies, regulations 
and institutional transparency which regulate the behaviours of subsidiary companies 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009, Lu, Liu, Wright, & Filatotchev, 2014). The values of 




and higher quality of the host country institutional environment. For robustness test purposes, 
I also use the host country institutional environment variable which is constructed by the 
subsidiary’s share of the firm’s number of employees and the quality of the host country 
institutional environment.  
4.3.4 Control variables 
In the empirical models, I include several performance and financial characteristics of the firm 
to control for factors potentially affecting hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness.  
Firm size. Prior studies show that firm size can  affect the firm’s organizational complexity 
because  firms  of a larger size may tend to have more constituting components both 
operationally and structurally which may lead to a higher level of organizational complexity 
(Beyer & Trice, 1979, Blau, 1970, Blau & Schoenherr, 1971, Li, Meng, Wang, & Zhou, 2008). 
In addition to its effect on organizational complexity, firm size may also affect the firm’s level 
of opaqueness, since larger firms tend to release annual reports and disclosures that are less 
readable (Dempsey, Harrison, Luchtenberg, & Seiler, 2012, Li & Madarász, 2008). I therefore 
use firm size as the control variable. Firm size is calculated as the log of a firm’s total assets. 
Leverage. Previous research finds that a firm’s financial characteristics such as financial 
leverage tend to influence the firm’s level of opaqueness  because a higher value of leverage 
implies that the creditors of the firm can get access to other sources of firm information. This  
indicates that the firms whose leverage value is high usually tend to be more opaque (Duru, 
Wang, & Zhao, 2013). Leverage is calculated as the sum of long-term debt and current 
liabilities divided by the sum of the value of long-term debt, current liabilities, common equity 
and preferred equity.   
Profitability. Performance and profitability of the firm can  also affect the firm’s level of 




opaqueness and tend to be more transparent as  opaqueness could affect the firm’s capital costs 
among other aspects (Duru, Wang, & Zhao, 2013). Therefore, I control for the firm’s 
profitability in the model. Profitability is calculated as the firm’s income divided by total annual 
sales.  
Research and development (R&D). I  also include the firm’s expenditure on research and 
development (R&D) as the control variable because the R&D level indicates the firm’s level 
of internal specialisation that implies organizational complexity (Dooley, 2002). In the model, 
I calculate R&D as the firm’s book value of R&D expenditure divided by total annual sales.   
Capital expenditure. I use the firm’s capital expenditure to control for managerial decisions 
and other operational aspects that may affect the firm’s organizational complexity and 
opaqueness. In the model, the firm’s capital expenditure is calculated as the book value of 
capital expenditure scaled by the total annual sales.   
Book-to-market ratio. The book- to- market asset ratio indicates the worth of the firm and is 
more accurate than the firm’s market value in evaluating the value of the firm. The book- to- 
market asset ratio is calculated as the ratio between the firms’ total assets and the sum of total 
liabilities and the number of outstanding shares multiplied by the closing share price. 
Share price. Share price estimates the value of the firm assets based on future expectations 
which are related to firm opaqueness. Following Armstrong, Core and Guay (2014), I  calculate 
share price as the annual mean value of the daily closing market price per share (Armstrong, 
Core, & Guay, 2014). 
Scaled Amihud’s illiquidity. Amihud’s illiquidity indicates the price impact which measures 
investors’ demand for a return premium to compensate for transaction costs. Amihud’s 




I calculate scaled Amihud’s illiquidity as the annual average of the daily ratio of stock’s return 
to the trading volume, scaled by the number of outstanding shares. 
Firm age. Firm age is calculated as the natural log of the difference between the year of 
observation and the earliest date when the firm appeared in the CRSP database.   
 
4.4 Models 
Panel-data regression models are used to analyse whether hierarchical complexity affects the 
opaqueness of firms. The models use corporate opaqueness as the dependent variable and the 
firm-year observations cover time periods of 5 years. In the empirical models, I regress the 
dependent variable on explanatory variables with firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, industry 
fixed effects and state fixed effects. Following the formal regression analysis, I also consider 
the potential bias of the research which I address in the robustness test section. Specifically, 
potential bias refers to the endogenous nature of the relationship between hierarchical 
complexity and opaqueness. There are three types of endogeneity that may exist in this research. 
First, the models may suffer from an omitted variable bias. In the regression models, there 
could be unobservable characteristics that do not change over time and these unobservable and 
time-invariant characteristics could be correlated to the independent variable but are not 
included in the models. Consequently, the inclusion of these characteristics in the error term 
correlates the independent variables with the error term, making the independent variable 
endogenous. The correlations between the independent variable and the error term cause the 
estimate on the coefficient of the independent variable to be inconsistent and biased 
(Wooldridge, 2010). Employing within-group fixed effects addresses this issue by eliminating 
the unobserved and time-invariant characteristics from the models. Thus, drawing on 




Second, the models may suffer from a simultaneous endogeneity bias. In the thesis analysis, 
my underlying argument is based on the effect of hierarchical complexity on opaqueness. 
However, one could argue that the direction of causation between hierarchical complexity and 
firm opaqueness could be reversed. Since more opaque firms could have tendencies to be 
involved in more complex firm structures, it is possible that more opaque firms might be 
involved in a higher degree of hierarchical complexity which is indicated by establishing a 
number of subsidiary companies that operate at different hierarchical levels. As a result, it 
could be difficult to identify and determine cause and effect between the two variables. To 
reduce the impact of potential reverse causality by using lagged explanatory variables in the 
models, I lag the independent variables, control variables and moderator variables by one year. 
Moreover, in order to address the reverse causality problem further, I use the changes in 
dividends as the moderator to perform additional robustness tests. 
Third, the models may suffer from dynamic endogeneity bias because it is possible that the 
values of firm opaqueness in past periods could influence the realizations of firm opaqueness 
in contemporary periods. Since outside investors could make investment decisions based on 
previous firm performance and behaviours, firms’ previous level of opaqueness could be a 
reference for investors to make investment decisions and affect the level of opaqueness of the 
current period.    It is therefore likely that the past realizations of the dependent variable could 
affect the current realizations of the dependent variable. Consequently, the coefficient estimate 
on the independent variable could be biased.  
To address this and the other issues of endogeneity, Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest  
dynamic panel regressions using the generalized method of moments (difference- GMM of 
dynamic panel regressions) which correct for all three types of endogeneity, namely the 
endogenous variable bias,  reverse causality endogeneity and  dynamic endogeneity (Abdallah, 




lagged dependent variables, the models could eliminate unobservable and time-invariant 
characteristics which are attributed to the error term. Following this, the lagged differences of 
the dependent variables and the explanatory variables are then used as instruments. In addition, 
the GMM method does not require the strong spherical disturbance assumption of the error 
term and the GMM estimators are efficient and consistent (Chen, 2010). Therefore, following 
Abdallah, Goergen and O'Sullivan (2015), I draw on dynamic panel regressions with 
difference- GMM to address the endogenous variable bias, reverse causality bias and dynamic 
endogeneity bias. 
Further, I also use sensitivity checks to examine whether the relationship between hierarchical 
complexity and opaqueness could be affected by the change of indicator variables in the 
robustness test. Since the change of indicator variables might influence the signs of coefficient 
and significance of the variables, I use alternative dependent variables to examine the 




































Chapter 5 Results 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I present the results of my empirical investigation into the relationship between 
hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness and the moderating effects of firms’ related 
corporate diversification, unrelated corporate diversification, home country institutional 
environment quality and host country institutional environment quality. This chapter starts with 
the univariate analysis of the variables. Next, I present the empirical results of the baseline 
relationship between hierarchical complexity and opaqueness. I then test the models that 
include moderator variables so as to examine whether the relationship between hierarchical 
complexity and opaqueness could be affected by corporate diversifications and institutional 
environments. Following the main analysis, I then perform the robustness tests in order to 
address the potential endogeneity bias of the empirical investigations. The last section 
concludes. 
 
5.2 Descriptive analysis 
I take several steps to obtain the results on the relationship between hierarchical complexity 
and opaqueness. First, I present the mean values of hierarchical complexity by different 
industry groups and the evolving trend of hierarchical complexity from 2012 to 2016. 
Following this, I also present the industry distributions of sample firms by dividing the sample 
into different industry groups according to the industry classification scheme reported by 
French and Fama (1997) (Fama & French, 1997). I have excluded industries classified as 
belonging to the miscellaneous categories. Table 1 describes the distribution of mean 
hierarchical complexity in ascending orders, the changes of hierarchical complexity through 




Table 1 are obtained based on firms with hierarchical complexity data. In terms of the industry 
membership of the firms, I include the percentage of firms in the industry in the parenthesis by 
dividing the actual number of firms by the total number of firms of each year. Based on the 4-
digit SIC codes, 42 industries are represented by sample firms, with 25 industries represented 
by at least ten firms.  The number and the percentage of the firms are as follows and the number 
and the percentage are calculated based on mean values through the sample years. Business 
services (192 firms, 12.43%), pharmaceutical products (175 firms, 11.32%), petroleum and 
natural gas (104 firms, 6.75%), electronic equipment (61 firms, 3.97%), transportation (56 
firms, 3.61%), machinery (54 firms, 3.48%), wholesale (49 firms, 3.21%), medical equipment 
(47 firms, 3.04%), healthcare (35 firms, 2.28%), chemicals (35 firms, 2.28%), retail (32 firms, 
2.11%), construction materials (30 firms, 1.96%), computers (28 firms, 1.85%), automobiles 
and trucks (28 firms, 1.85%) and telecommunications (27 firms, 1.76%) are each represented 
by at least 25 firms.  
Following this, I demonstrate how hierarchical complexity behaves according to different 
industry groups. As expected, it can be seen that hierarchical complexity is at a relatively low 
level among light industries that manufacture products for consumers and end-users, while 
most firms which belong to heavy industries with complex processes that manufacture large 
and heavy equipment and facilities have a relatively higher level of hierarchical complexity. 
Interestingly, I also note that firms in textiles, food products, shipping containers and tobacco 
products have relatively high levels of complexity which may be attributed to the firms’ 
complex subsidiary and operational structures. Moreover, the evolving trend of hierarchical 
complexity through the sample period shows a general increase  and this suggests that the firms 
may become more hierarchically complex as they grow and expand their business. 
I then examine how indicators of corporate opaqueness behave at different levels of 




into 10 groups by quantile categories, with smaller group numbers indicating lower degrees of 
hierarchical complexity. Then, I assign the mean value of the opaqueness index and the mean 
value of information transparency to each of the groups. The results are presented in Table 2. 
It can be seen from the second column in Table 2 that the values of the opaqueness index evolve 
with a general ascending trend as the level of hierarchical complexity increases, suggesting that 
hierarchical complexity could be positively associated with the opaqueness index. Moreover, 
the third column in Table 2 shows that the values of the information transparency variable goes 
down as hierarchical complexity increases, suggesting that increases in hierarchical complexity 
could decrease the level of transparency and lead to firm opaqueness.  
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables: the means, standard errors, minimum 
and maximum values. From the table, it can be seen that the mean value of hierarchical 
complexity is 1.523. The mean value of the opaqueness index is 0.459 which is comparable to 
the value of 0.524 as reported in Duru, Wang and Zhao (2013) who find that staggered boards 
of the firm could be beneficial to firm value as corporate opaqueness increases. In addition, the 
mean value of information transparency is 1.748, which is similar to the value of 2.298 as 
reported in Durnev, Errunza and Molchanov (2009) who find that in countries with weak 
property rights protection, corporate transparency could decrease the investment efficiency of 
firms. 
In regard to the correlations of the variables, as expected, hierarchical complexity is positively 
correlated to the opaqueness index and is negatively correlated to the information transparency 
variable. Thus, the results indicate a positive relationship between hierarchical complexity and 
the opaqueness index and a negative relationship between hierarchical complexity and 
information transparency. Moreover, the opaqueness index is negatively correlated to the 
information transparency variable. It is also noted that hierarchical complexity is negatively 




this simple correlation analysis also shows that the opaqueness index is positively correlated to 
R2, while information transparency and idiosyncratic risk are negatively correlated to R2.  
Further, I also conduct multicollinearity tests to examine potential multicollinearity among 
explanatory variables using the variance inflation factor (VIF) values. Table 3 shows that all 
the VIF values are below 3.29 with the mean VIF value equalling 1.83, indicating that 
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a concern in this study (Pan & Jackson, 2008). I proceed to 




Table 5.1 Distribution of hierarchical complexity by industry 
Distribution of mean hierarchical complexity by different industry groups in ascending orders, the evolving trend of hierarchical complexity and 

















No. of firms in 
2014 
Alcoholic beverages 0.326 0.512 3(0.26%) 0.646 3(0.29%) 0.428 4(0.29%) 
Pharmaceutical 
products 
0.567 0.453 140(12.32%) 0.525 125(12.19%) 0.537 202(14.90%) 
Candy and soda 0.626 0.098 3(0.26%) 0.567 3(0.29%) 0.358 4(0.29%) 
Recreational products 0.864 0.744 7(0.61%) 0.490 5(0.48%) 1.045 9(0.66%) 
Medical equipment 0.870 0.874 47(4.13%) 0.817 30(2.92%) 0.812 56((4.13%) 
Non-metallic mining 0.883 0.823 8(0.70%) 0.659 9(0.87%) 0.757 11(0.81%) 
Restaurants, hotel, 
motel 
1.089 1.183 19(1.67%) 1.200 18(1.75%) 1.131 27(1.99%) 
Retail 1.100 0.875 30(2.64%) 0.713 30(2.92%) 1.041 34(2.50%) 
Coal 1.101 1.000 5(0.44%) 0.947 5(0.48%) 1.326 4(0.29%) 
Precious metals 1.178 0.961 4(0.35%) 0.953 4(0.39%) 1.235 4(0.29%) 
Petroleum and natural 
gas 
1.212 1.004 96(8.45%) 0.987 99(9.65%) 1.306 111(8.19%) 
Apparel 1.278 1.137 9(0.79%) 1.145 7(0.68%) 1.343 9(0.66%) 
Transportation 1.306 1.006 51(4.48%) 0.959 52(5.07%) 1.411 55(4.05%) 
Healthcare 1.355 1.084 35(3.08%) 1.234 31(3.02%) 1.337 37(2.73%) 
Electronic equipment 1.407 1.291 66(5.80%) 1.277 46(4.48%) 1.313 74(5.46%) 
Defence 1.461 1.103 6(0.52%) 1.327 5(0.48%) 1.612 6(0.44%) 
Business services 1.463 1.278 178(15.66%) 1.334 150(14.63%) 1.259 220(16.23%) 
Shipbuilding, railroad 
equipment 
1.531 1.246 7(0.61%) 1.565 7(0.68%) 1.517 7(0.51%) 
Entertainment 1.555 1.202 20(1.76%) 0.693 19(1.85%) 1.603 23(1.69%) 
Computers 1.653 1.305 31(2.72%) 1.342 22(2.14%) 1.600 36(2.65%) 
Electrical equipment 1.786 1.687 13(1.14%) 1.609 14(1.36%) 1.790 16(1.18%) 
Wholesale 1.832 1.461 46(4.04%) 1.438 45(4.39%) 1.853 53(3.91%) 
Construction materials 1.856 1.691 29(2.55%) 1.585 30(2.92%) 1.712 32(2.36%) 





















No. of firms in 
2014 
Personal services 1.873 1.425 12(1.05%) 1.411 13(1.26%) 1.783 14(1.03%) 
Consumer goods 1.953 1.811 14(1.23%) 1.597 14(1.36%) 1.876 17(1.25%) 
Steel works, etc. 1.981 2.311 17(1.49%) 2.067 17(1.65%) 1.662 19(1.40%) 
Printing and publishing 1.989 1.283 5(0.44%) 1.306 3(0.29%) 1.530 8(0.59%) 
Automobiles and 
trucks 
2.069 1.542 27(2.37%) 1.998 26(2.53%) 1.914 31(2.28%) 
Telecommunications 2.098 1.819 26(2.28%) 1.966 23(2.24%) 2.107 31(2.28%) 
Rubber and plastic 
products 
2.266 2.264 8(0.70%) 2.393 8(0.78%) 2.125 9(0.66%) 
Machinery 2.429 2.272 49(4.31%) 2.306 50(4.87%) 2.286 54(3.98%) 
Fabricated products 2.449 1.723 3(0.26%) 1.913 3(0.29%) 1.939 3(0.22%) 
Chemicals 2.578 2.502 32(2.81%) 2.077 30(2.92%) 2.651 38(2.80%) 
Measuring and control 
equipment 
2.602 2.438 24(2.11%) 2.596 18(1.75%) 2.373 27(1.99%) 
Business supplies 2.662 2.820 15(1.32%) 2.810 14(1.36%) 2.561 16(1.18%) 
Food products 3.213 3.400 13(1.14%) 2.750 14(1.36%) 3.302 15(1.10%) 
Aircraft 3.237 3.140 9(0.79%) 3.778 7(0.68%) 2.781 9(0.66%) 
Shipping containers 3.515 3.302 6(0.52%) 4.312 6(0.58%) 2.590 6(0.44%) 
Textiles 3.568 2.040 4(0.35%) 2.683 4(0.39%) 3.148 4(0.29%) 
Tobacco products 6.509 6.232 2(0.17%) 6.074 2(0.19%) 8.010 2(0.14%) 









Table 5.1. Continued 
Industry Hierarchical  
complexity 2015 
No. of firms in 2015 Hierarchical  
complexity 2016 
No. of firms in 2016  
Alcoholic beverages 0.087 4(0.34%) 0.084 4(0.27%) 
Pharmaceutical 
products 
0.695 160(13.80%) 0.595 250(16.96%) 
Candy and soda 0.613 3(0.25%) 1.179 5(0.33%) 
Recreational products 0.621 6(0.51%) 1.146 9(0.61%) 
Medical equipment 1.020 40(3.45%) 0.850 63(4.27%) 
Non-metallic mining 1.129 11(0.94%) 1.001 10(0.67%) 
Restaurants, hotel, 
motel 
1.120 25(2.15%) 0.916 33(2.23%) 
Retail 1.276 32(2.76%) 1.485 38(2.57%) 
Coal 1.131 6(0.51%) 1.122 7(0.47%) 
Precious metals 1.303 3(0.25%) 1.466 4(0.27%) 
Petroleum and natural 
gas 
1.366 106(9.14%) 1.354 111(7.53%) 
Apparel 1.571 7(0.60%) 1.233 9(0.61%) 
Transportation 1.474 60(5.17%) 1.587 62(4.20%) 
Healthcare 1.605 36(3.10%) 1.485 38(2.57%) 
Electronic equipment 1.663 47(4.05%) 1.521 75(5.08%) 
Defence 1.597 5(0.43%) 1.665 6(0.40%) 
Business services 1.734 171(14.75%) 1.670 244(16.55%) 
Shipbuilding, railroad 
equipment 
1.704 7(0.60%) 1.622 7(0.47%) 
Entertainment 1.818 19(1.63%) 2.343 22(1.49%) 
Computers 1.801 20(1.72%) 2.128 35(2.37%) 
Electrical equipment 1.829 15(1.29%) 1.957 18(1.22%) 
Wholesale 2.065 50(4.31%) 2.233 55(3.73%) 
Construction materials 1.968 30(2.58%) 2.313 31(2.10%) 
Construction 1.963 15(1.29%) 1.946 21(1.42%) 
Personal services 2.332 13(1.12%) 2.349 14(0.94%) 




Table 5.1. Continued 
Industry Hierarchical  
complexity 2015 
No. of firms in 2015 Hierarchical  
complexity 2016 
No. of firms in 2016 
Steel works, etc. 1.922 19(1.63%) 1.987 20(1.35%) 
Printing and publishing 2.642 7(0.60%) 2.507 9(0.61%) 
Automobiles and trucks 2.341 27(2.32%) 2.536 29(1.96%) 
Telecommunications 2.165 26(2.24%) 2.366 31(2.10%) 
Rubber and plastic 
products 
2.435 9(0.77%) 2.126 9(0.61%) 
Machinery 2.628 57(4.91%) 2.598 60(4.07%) 
Fabricated products 3.610 3(0.25%) 3.063 3(0.20%) 
Chemicals 3.142 36(3.10%) 2.441 41(2.78%) 
Measuring and control 
equipment 
3.001 19(1.63%) 2.697 28(1.89%) 
Business supplies 2.579 16(1.38%) 2.574 17(1.15%) 
Food products 3.573 16(1.38%) 3.034 17(1.15%) 
Aircraft 3.294 8(0.69%) 3.318 9(0.61%) 
Shipping containers 3.564 6(0.51%) 3.807 6(0.40%) 
Textiles 5.246 4(0.34%) 4.724 4(0.27%) 
Tobacco products 7.689 2(0.17%) 4.539 2(0.13%) 












Table 5.2 Distribution of corporate opaqueness variables 
Distribution of mean opaqueness indicators by different hierarchical complexity groups. 
Hierarchical complexity group Mean opaqueness index Mean information transparency 
Group 1 0.460 2.431 
Group 2 0.297 2.354 
Group 3 0.494 1.253 
Group 4 0.511 1.890 
Group 5 0.526 1.785 
Group 6 0.522 1.684 
Group 7 0.541 1.495 
Group 8 0.534 1.188 
Group 9 0.530 0.920 
  Group 10 0.533 0.694 
Note: The order of hierarchical complexity groups is ranked from small to high complexity: Group 1 contains the smallest value of hierarchical complexity 




















Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Summary statistics and correlation analysis 
                                                   Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 1 2 3 4 5 6 VIF 
1. Opaqueness index 0.459 0.215 0.000 0.866 1.000      n/a 
2.Information 
transparency 
1.748 1.578 -0.649 7.939 -0.153 1.000      
3. Idiosyncratic risk -6.046 1.12 -8.424 -3.273 -0.334 0.522 1.000    n/a 
4. Idiosyncratic risk2 0.221 0.164 0.000 0.656 0.138 -0.842 -0.618 1.000   n/a 
5. Hierarchical 
complexity 
1.523 1.838 0.000 9.358 0.111 -0.331 -0.394 0.402 1.000  2.31 
6. Firm size 6.196 2.166 1.086 11.148 0.272 -0.556 -0.605 0.604 0.535 1.000 3.12 
7. Leverage 0.347 0.413 -0.316 2.445 -0.070 -0.107 -0.018 0.119 0.171 0.221 1.20 
8. R&D 
expenditures/total sales 
5.107 27.131 0.000 228.881 -0.078 0.105 0.207 -0.113 -0.122 -0.172 3.27 
9. Capital 
expenditure/total sales 
0.266 1.019 0.000 8.518 -0.105 0.056 0.184 -0.072 -0.112 -0.092 3.15 
10. Book-to-market 
ratio 
0.684 0.603 0.077 4.479 -0.385 -0.007 0.013 0.029 0.105 -0.003 1.31 
11. Profitability -0.149 0.457 -2.732 0.303 0.356 -0.286 -0.514 0.297 0.225 0.549 1.57 
12. Share price 30.343 34.968 0.773 202.713 0.226 -0.341 -0.502 0.383 0.273 0.560 1.89 
13. Scaled Amihud 
illiquidity 
0.003 2.832 -15.390 15.317 0.028 -0.021 -0.073 0.022 0.020 0.030 1.01 
14. Log(firm age) 2.429 1.122 0.000 4.477 0.055 -0.219 -0.410 0.296 0.268 0.280 1.27 
15. Related corporate 
diversification 
0.080 0.226 0.000 1.188 0.092 -0.182 -0.225 0.231 0.263 0.283 1.21 
16. Unrelated corporate 
diversification 
0.118 0.265 0.000 1.219 0.149 -0.204 -0.296 0.273 0.261 0.321 1.24 
17. Home country 
institutions                       
11.429 2.154 0.000 12.865 -0.098 0.051 0.129 -0.076 -0.019 -0.104 1.04 
18. Host country 
institutions 
0.342 0.670 0.000 9.123 0.197 -0.272 -0.355 0.339 0.563 0.393 2.06 
19. Host country 
institutions1 




Table 5.3. Continued 
                                               7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1. Opaqueness 
index 
             
2.Information 
transparency 
             
3. Idiosyncratic 
risk 
             
4. Idiosyncratic 
risk1 
             
5. Hierarchical 
complexity 
             
6. Firm size              








-0.003 0.747 1.000           
10. Book-to-
market ratio 
-0.044 -0.034 0.061 1.000          
11. Profitability -0.018 -0.288 -0.213 0.058 1.000         
12. Share price 0.039 -0.093 -0.071 -0.196 0.303 1.000        
13. Scaled Amihud 
illiquidity 
-0.023 -0.002 -0.035 -0.019 0.064 0.036 1.000       








0.082 -0.075 -0.078 0.023 0.172 0.183 0.021 0.271 0.207 1.000    
17. Home country 
institutions                       




Table 5.3. Continued 
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
18. Host country 
institutions 
0.099 -0.092 -0.090 -0.056 0.167 0.248 0.011 0.250 0.221 0.231 -0.054 1.000  
19. Host country 
institutions1 
0.086 -0.093 -0.096 -0.053 0.197 0.173 0.015 0.245 0.199 0.248 -0.071 0.663 1.000 
Note: Idiosyncratic risk1 variable is the values of coefficient of determination R2 which is drawn from the market model regressions. Host country 
institutions1 variable is the employee number-based host country institutional environment variable. Correlations with an absolute value equal to or larger 




5.3 Multivariate analysis 
In this section, I conduct multivariate analysis to examine the relationship between hierarchical 
complexity and opaqueness. First, I carry out a set of analyses with the opaqueness index and 
information transparency as the dependent variables. In this section, I perform the empirical 
analysis by testing the baseline models with lagged independent variables and lagged control 
variables so as to reduce the impact of potential causality. Following this, I then perform the 
analysis by including lagged moderator variables into the models so as to investigate the impact 
of moderators on the relationship between hierarchical complexity and opaqueness. The 
independent variables, control variables and moderator variables included in the regressions 
are lagged for one year period. I use cluster standard robust errors in the regressions. In order 
to avoid the impact of extreme values, I winsorize the top and bottom 1% values of all 
continuous variables, including the dependent variables, independent variables, control 
variables and moderator variables.   
5.3.1 The Opaqueness index as the dependent variable 
In this part, I estimate the models with the opaqueness index as the dependent variable. Panel 
1 presents the regression results of the baseline models and models with moderator variables. 
As is displayed in the results, I include the p-value in parentheses. Column (1) in Table 1 of 
Panel 1 includes only the dependent variable, lagged independent variables and lagged control 
variables. This permits to test Hypothesis 1. Results from the models show that the opaqueness 
index is positively and significantly related to hierarchical complexity (α=0.0069, p=0.000). 
The statistical significance indicates that Hypothesis 1 is supported, suggesting that increases 
in hierarchical complexity could be related to higher level of opaqueness and less transparency. 
Next, I investigate models including moderator variables to examine whether the relationship 




diversifications, unrelated corporate diversifications, home country institutional environment 
quality and host country institutional environment quality. The Models in Columns (2) through 
(5) of Table 1 in Panel 1 include the moderator variables, as proposed in Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 3 
and 4. I first investigate the moderating effect of firms’ related corporate diversifications and 
unrelated corporate diversifications. The values of the corporate diversification entropy reflect 
the degree of corporate diversifications of firms. It can be seen from Column (2) that the 
coefficient estimate on the moderation term between hierarchical complexity and firms’ related 
corporate diversification entropy variable is significantly negative (α=-0.0180, p=0.000). Thus, 
the results support Hypothesis 2a, suggesting that firms’ hierarchical complexity could have 
less positive impact on the level of opaqueness in the presence of related corporate 
diversifications.  
In terms of the moderating effect of unrelated corporate diversification, it can be seen from 
Column (3) that the coefficient estimate on the moderation term between hierarchical 
complexity and firms’ unrelated corporate diversification entropy variable is insignificant (α=-
0.0005, p= 0.917), which suggests that the degree of firms’ unrelated corporate diversifications 
could not effectively moderate the relationship between hierarchical complexity and 









Panel 1: Main results using the opaqueness index as the dependent variable 
Table 1 of Panel 1. Main results of regressions using the opaqueness index  
Regression of the opaqueness index on lagged hierarchical complexity, lagged related corporate diversification entropy variable, lagged 
unrelated corporate diversification entropy variable, lagged home country institutional environment variable, lagged host country institutional 
environment variables and their interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Opaqueness index Opaqueness index Opaqueness index Opaqueness index Opaqueness index 
L.Hierarchical 
complexity 
0.0069*** 0.0113*** 0.0074*** -0.0083 0.0084*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.310) (0.000) 
      











      











      











      
L. Capital 
expenditure 
-0.0094 -0.0095 -0.0097 -0.0096 -0.0090 
 (0.140) (0.133) (0.127) (0.134) (0.162) 
      
L. Book-to-
market ratio 
-0.0304* -0.0298* -0.0323* -0.0311* -0.0322* 
 (0.018) (0.025) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) 
      
      




Table 1 of Panel 1. Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Opaqueness index Opaqueness index Opaqueness index Opaqueness index Opaqueness index 
L. Research & 
Development 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.796) (0.747) (0.756) (0.756) (0.820) 
      















-0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.993) (0.922) (0.868) (0.999) (0.982) 
      















 0.0639***    
  (0.001)    






 -0.0180***    
  (0.000)    
      
      
      




Table 1 of Panel 1. Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




  0.0277   
   (0.125)   






  -0.0005   
   (0.917)   





   0.0768  
    (0.717)  







   0.0292  
    (0.064)  




    0.0235** 
     (0.002) 
      




Table 1 of Panel 1. Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 






    -0.0036** 
     (0.008) 
Year fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2548 2449 2413 2548 2548 
F 30.892 26.828 26.648 26.084 27.135 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-values based on robust-standard errors are in parentheses 





Following this, I further explain the moderating effect of firms’ related corporate 
diversification using graphs. I show the moderating effect of the related corporate 
diversification entropy variable on the relationship between hierarchical complexity and 
opaqueness index, with hierarchical complexity running from 1 to 9 and related corporate 
diversification values at the mean value, one unit of standard deviation below and above the 
mean value. The moderating effect graph is displayed in Figure 1.  
Figure 5.1. Moderating effect of related corporate diversification on the opaqueness 
index and hierarchical complexity 
 
It can be seen from the graph above that the increasing values of firms’ related corporate 
diversifications negatively moderate the linkage between hierarchical complexity and the 
opaqueness index, suggesting that firms’ related corporate diversifications could weaken the 
positive relationship between hierarchical complexity and opaqueness. Moreover, the graph 




hierarchical complexity. This indicates that related corporate diversifications play more critical 
roles in more complex firms. 
I next investigate the moderating effect of the home country institutional environment quality 
of each U.S. federal state where the firms are established. For this purpose, Column (4) of 
Table 1 includes the federal state institutional environment of the home country variable into 
the model (see Hypotheses 3). The results in Column (4) show that the coefficient estimate on 
the interaction term (hierarchical complexity x state institutional environment) is insignificant 
(α=0.0292, p=0.064). The results suggest that an improved home country federal state 
institutional environment with strict regulations and legal systems does not effectively 
moderate the relationship between hierarchical complexity and opaqueness. Thus, Hypothesis 
3 is not supported. 
I then examine the moderating effects of the quality of the host country institutional 
environment by including the host country institutional environment quality variable into the 
models. The results in Column (5) show that the coefficient estimate on the interaction term 
between hierarchical complexity and the host country institutional environment variable is 
negative and significant (α=-0.0036, p=0.008). The results suggest that stronger regulations in 
the host countries where subsidiaries are located could produce more strict regulatory policies 
and legal enforcement on firms’ behaviors which makes the relationship between hierarchical 
complexity and firm opaqueness weaker. Therefore, the results support Hypothesis 4.  
Following this, I use graphs to further illustrate the moderating effect of the host country 
institutional environment. I show the moderating effect by plotting hierarchical complexity 
between the range of 1 and 9, for strong host country institutions (+ 1 S.D. above the mean), 
the mean score of host country institutions and weak host country institutions (-1 S.D. below 




Figure 5.2. Moderating effect of the host country institutional environment on the 
opaqueness index and hierarchical complexity 
 
The graph above shows that the host country institutional environment variable negatively 
moderates the relationship between hierarchical complexity and the opaqueness index. This 
suggests that an improved quality of host country institutions seems to mitigate the positive 
effect of hierarchical complexity on opaqueness. In addition, the graph further shows that the 
moderating effect of an increasing quality of host country institutions is more evident when 
applied to firms with a low degree of hierarchical complexity. This indicates that the regulating 






5.3.2 Information transparency as the dependent variable 
In this section, I use the information transparency of firms as another indicator of corporate 
opaqueness.  Information transparency could indicate the amount of firm-specific information 
received and absorbed by outside investors and thus it captures the firm-specific information 
accessibility and information environment quality of  outside investors (Aabo, Pantzalis, & 
Park, 2015, Durnev, Errunza, & Molchanov, 2009, Jin & Myers, 2006). Therefore, I employ 
information transparency as an alternative proxy for corporate opaqueness. 
Table 2 of Panel 1 displays the regression results using information transparency as the 
dependent variable. In Table 2, the model in Column (1) examines the baseline hypothesis by 
including only the dependent, independent and control variables. It can be seen from the results 
that the coefficient estimate on hierarchical complexity is negative and significant (α=-0.0381, 
p=0.013). Since lower values of information transparency are associated with a reduced amount 
of firm-specific information obtained by outside investors and a higher level of firm 
opaqueness, the results suggest that higher hierarchical complexity reduces the quality of 
outside investors’ information environment and thus hierarchical complexity could increase 
the level of opaqueness of firms. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
Column (2) through (5) in Table 2 of Panel 1 investigate the moderating effects of firms’ related 
corporate diversification, unrelated corporate diversification, home country institutional 
environment and host country institutional environment. I start by examining the moderating 
effect of firms’ corporate diversification, including related and unrelated corporate 
diversification. As is displayed in Column (2) and (3), the coefficient estimates of the 
interaction terms between hierarchical complexity and the related and unrelated corporate 
diversification entropy variable are insignificant (α=0.0728, p=0.090; α=0.0664, p=0.128). 




In terms of the moderating effect of the quality of the home country institutional environment, 
results in Column (4) show that the coefficient estimate on the moderating term between 
hierarchical complexity and home country institutional environment is insignificant (α=-
0.0292, p=0.869). This suggests that increasing the quality of the home country institutional 
environment represented by more strict institutional rules and regulations cannot effectively 
moderate the relationship between hierarchical complexity and informational transparency of 
firms. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is not supported. 
Column (5) presents the moderating effect of the indicator used to proxy the host country 
institutional environment quality. It can be seen from Column (5) that the coefficient estimate 
on the interaction term between hierarchical complexity and the host country institutional 
environment variable is positive and significant (α=0.0520, p=0.002). These results suggest 
that hierarchical complexity could have less negative impact on information transparency of 
firms in the presence of increasing quality of host country institutions. Therefore, the results 
support Hypothesis 4. 
In order to further display the moderating effect of the host country institutional environment, 
I then plot the impact of the host country institutional environment on the relationship between 
hierarchical complexity and information transparency. On a graph, I show the moderating 
effect by plotting hierarchical complexity between the range of 1 and 9 for strong host country 
institutions (+ 1 S.D. above the mean), the mean score of host country institutions and weak 








Figure 5.3. Moderating effect of the host country institutional environment on 
information transparency and hierarchical complexity 
 
 
It can be seen from the graph that the host country institutional environment positively 
moderates the relationship between hierarchical complexity and information transparency. This 
suggests that an increase in the quality of host country institutions, which is indicated by more 
strict regulatory policies and a more transparent institutional environment, seems to alleviate 





Panel 1: Main results using information transparency as the dependent variable 
Table 2 of Panel 1. Main results of regressions using information transparency 
Regression of information transparency on lagged hierarchical complexity, lagged related corporate diversification entropy variable, lagged 
unrelated corporate diversification entropy variable, lagged home country institutional environment variable, lagged host country institutional 
environment variables and their interactions 













-0.0381* -0.0503* -0.0499** -0.0229 -0.0744*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.007) (0.797) (0.001) 
      











      











      











      
L. Capital 
expenditure 
0.0443 0.0382 0.0359 0.0440 0.0388 
 (0.522) (0.581) (0.605) (0.525) (0.575) 
      
L. Book-to-
market ratio 
0.8643*** 0.9011*** 0.9237*** 0.8637*** 0.8907*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      




Table 2 of Panel 1. Continued 











L. Research & 
Development 
-0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0005 
 (0.772) (0.790) (0.806) (0.775) (0.795) 
      















-0.0296 -0.0259 -0.0267 -0.0295 -0.0291 
 (0.051) (0.098) (0.089) (0.052) (0.055) 
      















 -0.4195*    
  (0.010)    






 0.0728    
  (0.090)    
      
      




Table 2 of Panel 1. Continued 














  -0.3643*   
   (0.029)   






  0.0664   
   (0.128)   





   0.7830  
    (0.708)  







   -0.0292  
    (0.869)  




    -0.2514*** 
     (0.000) 




Table 2 of Panel 1. Continued 
















    0.0520** 
     (0.002) 
Year fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2534 2435 2399 2534 2534 
F 87.502 72.730 74.648 76.255 77.467 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-values based on robust-standard errors are in parentheses 





5.4 Robustness tests 
So far, I have examined the impact that hierarchical complexity has on the corporate 
opaqueness of firms, as well as the influence of moderator variables on the relationship. 
However, the study may suffer from endogeneity bias to some extent. There are three types of 
endogeneity bias that may apply in this case. First, some variables may be omitted in the models. 
Second, reverse causality may exist in the models. Third, there may be measurement bias which 
applies to the measures of variables. Thus, in this section, following the main analysis, I 
perform the robustness tests and address the problems above.  
5.4.1 Fixed effects interaction tests 
In the previous section, I run the regressions by including year fixed effects and state fixed 
effects which reduces the impact of omitted variables that are not included in the models. In 
this part, I perform the analysis by including industry fixed effects into the models. In the 
analysis, I use lagged explanatory variables which include the lagged independent variables, 
lagged control variables and lagged moderator variables to address the influence of potential 
reverse causality. Table 1 and Table 2 in Panel 2 present the results with the opaqueness index 
and information transparency being the dependent variables. 
As is displayed in the results of Table 1, Column (1) shows that the coefficient estimate on 
hierarchical complexity is positive and significant (α=0.0039, p=0.036), which suggests a 
positive relationship between hierarchical complexity and opaqueness index.  
Column (2) and Column (3) present the results when the related and unrelated corporate 
diversification entropy variables are included as the moderators. It can be seen from the results 
that the coefficient estimates on the interaction term between hierarchical complexity and the 
related corporate diversification entropy variable is negative and significant (α=-0.0131, 




corporate diversification is insignificant (α=-0.0045, p=0.505). Thus, the results suggest that 
related corporate diversification could mitigate the positive relationship between hierarchical 
complexity and opaqueness index, while unrelated corporate diversification cannot effectively 
affect such relationship. 
In regard to the moderating effect of the quality of the home country institutional environment, 
the results in Column (4) show that the coefficient estimate on the moderating term between 
hierarchical complexity and the home country institutional environment variable remains 
insignificant (α=0.0027, p=0.884). The results indicate that the quality of home country 
institutions cannot moderate the relationship between hierarchical complexity and opaqueness 
index. 
In terms of the host country institutional environment variables, Columns (5) through (6) 
present the moderating effect of the two indicators used to proxy host country institutional 
environments quality. In addition to the host country institutions variable that is calculated on 
total assets of subsidiary companies, which is used in the main analysis, I use the host country 
institutions variable which is calculated on the number of employees of subsidiaries in Column 
(6) for robustness test purposes. It can be seen from Column (5) that the coefficient estimate 
on the interaction term between hierarchical complexity and the total assets-based host country 
institutional environment variable is negative and significant (α=-0.0037, p=0.029). Moreover, 
as is shown in Column (6), the coefficient estimate on the moderating term between 
hierarchical complexity and the second host country institutional environment variable, which 
is the number of employees-based, is negative and significant (α=-0.0034, p=0.043). The 
results suggest that increases in the quality of the host country’s institutional environment 





Panel 2: Robustness tests results using fixed effects interactions 
Table 1 of Panel 2. Regressions using the opaqueness index with year and industry fixed effect 
Regression of the opaqueness index on lagged hierarchical complexity, lagged related corporate diversification entropy variable, lagged 
unrelated corporate diversification entropy variable, lagged home country institutional environment variable, lagged host country institutional 
environment variables and their interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Opaqueness index Opaqueness index Opaqueness index Opaqueness index Opaqueness index Opaqueness index 
L. Hierarchical 
complexity 
0.0039* 0.0069** 0.0050* 0.0025 0.0061* 0.0045 
 (0.036) (0.004) (0.027) (0.797) (0.012) (0.052) 
       













       













       













       
L. Capital 
expenditure 
-0.0082 -0.0079 -0.0079 -0.0082 -0.0079 -0.0076 
 (0.268) (0.284) (0.286) (0.266) (0.285) (0.308) 
       
L. Book-to-
market ratio 
-0.0635*** -0.0649*** -0.0655*** -0.0636*** -0.0654*** -0.0689*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
       




Table 1 of Panel 2. Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Opaqueness index Opaqueness index Opaqueness index Opaqueness index Opaqueness index Opaqueness index 
L. Research & 
Development 
0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.774) (0.864) (0.874) (0.787) (0.788) (0.806) 
       

















-0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0012 
 (0.437) (0.584) (0.591) (0.447) (0.408) (0.394) 
       

















 0.0292     
  (0.166)     






 -0.0131**     
  (0.009)     
       
       
       




Table 1 of Panel 2. Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




  0.0367    
   (0.126)    






  -0.0045    
   (0.505)    





   0.0319   
    (0.516)   






   0.0027   
    (0.884)   
       
L. Host country 
institutional 
environment 
    0.0203*  
     (0.018)  
       
       




Table 1 of Panel 2. Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






    -0.0037*  
     (0.029)  




     0.0313*** 
      (0.000) 






     -0.0034* 
      (0.043) 
Year fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2535 2434 2397 2535 2535 2535 
F 20.956 18.310 17.489 17.481 18.176 18.682 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-values based on robust-standard errors are in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Note: Models in Column (5) include the host country institutional environment variable which is calculated based on the total assets of subsidiaries. For 





Table 2 presents the results by using the information transparency of firms as the dependent 
variable. Results in Column (1) show that the coefficient estimate on hierarchical complexity 
is negative but insignificant (α=-0.0083, p=0.608), which suggests that hierarchical complexity 
is insignificantly associated with information transparency when including industry fixed 
effects in the models. 
I then include the corporate diversification entropy variables into the models and the results are 
displayed in Column (2) and Column (3). The  results  show that the coefficient estimates on 
the moderating terms regarding related and unrelated corporate diversification are insignificant 
(α=0.0188, p=0.722; α=-0.0030, p=0.956, respectively). Thus, the results indicate that 
increases in firms’ related and unrelated corporate diversifications cannot effectively moderate 
the relationship between hierarchical complexity and information transparency.  
I then examine the moderating effect of the home country institutional environment quality. 
Column (4) reports the results by including the home country institutional environment quality 
indicator into the models. It can be seen from the results that the coefficient estimate on the 
interaction term between hierarchical complexity and the home country institutional 
environment variable is insignificant (α=0.0752, p=0.651), which indicates that institutional 
rules of the home country could not effectively affect the linkage between hierarchical 
complexity and information transparency. 
Columns (5) through (6) present the moderating effect of the host country institutional 
environments quality. As is displayed in the results, the coefficient estimates are insignificant 
regarding the moderating terms of total assets-based host country institutional environment and 
employee number-based host country institutional environment (α=0.0208, p=0.222; α=0.0038, 




could not effectively influence the linkage between hierarchical complexity and information 





















Panel 2: Robustness tests results using fixed effects interactions 
Table 2 of Panel 2. Regressions using information transparency with year and industry fixed effect 
Regression of information transparency on lagged hierarchical complexity, lagged related corporate diversification entropy variable, lagged 
unrelated corporate diversification entropy variable, lagged home country institutional environment variable, lagged host country institutional 
environment variables and their interactions 















-0.0083 -0.0108 -0.0068 -0.0472 -0.0233 -0.0027 
 (0.608) (0.609) (0.738) (0.587) (0.323) (0.909) 
       













       













       













       
L. Capital 
expenditure 
0.0519 0.0504 0.0509 0.0517 0.0510 0.0504 
 (0.531) (0.543) (0.539) (0.533) (0.538) (0.543) 
       
L. Book-to-
market ratio 
1.1544*** 1.1877*** 1.1838*** 1.1524*** 1.1640*** 1.1690*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       




Table 2 of Panel 2. Continued 













L. Research & 
Development 
-0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 
 (0.794) (0.787) (0.779) (0.786) (0.797) (0.804) 
       

















-0.0332* -0.0306* -0.0311* -0.0330* -0.0327* -0.0330* 
 (0.027) (0.049) (0.044) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) 
       

















 -0.1748     
  (0.393)     






 0.0188     
  (0.722)     
       
       




Table 2 of Panel 2. Continued 
















  0.1378    
   (0.535)    






  -0.0030    
   (0.956)    





   0.2322   
    (0.637)   






   0.0752   
    (0.651)   
       
L. Host country 
institutional 
environment 
    -0.0870  
     (0.258)  
       




Table 2 of Panel 2. Continued 


















    0.0208  
     (0.222)  




     -0.0882 
      (0.239) 






     0.0038 
      (0.824) 
Year fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2521 2420 2383 2521 2521 2521 
F 62.080 50.293 51.675 51.964 52.685 51.533 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-values based on robust-standard errors are in parentheses 






5.4.2 Dynamic panel regressions using general method of moments (GMM) 
In the previous sections, I draw on the interactions of fixed effects to reduce the potential bias 
derived from endogenous variables, the hierarchical complexity variable and the corporate 
diversification variable. I also regress the dependent variable on lagged explanatory variables 
so as to diminish the impact of potential reverse causality. Economic literature shows that the 
endogenous variable bias can be alleviated by including fixed effects in panel data regressions 
and reverse causality can be reduced or avoided by excluding contemporaneous values of 
explanatory variables (Green, Malpezzi, & Mayo, 2005, Hayo, Kutan, & Neuenkirch, 2010, 
Spilimbergo, 2009, Wooldridge, 2010). However, although employing fixed effects and 
excluding contemporaneous explanatory variables can decrease the impact of potential 
endogeneity to some extent, these two methods are not enough to address the potential 
endogeneity in the models. Therefore, in this section, I further address potential endogeneity 
by performing additional tests.  
Another approach I use to address potential endogeneity is to employ dynamic panel regression 
models. Following Abdallah, Goergen and O'Sullivan (2015), I use dynamic panel regressions 
with difference - general method of moments (GMM) which correct for the  endogenous 
variable bias, reverse causality bias and dynamic endogeneity bias so as to obtain  consistent 
and unbiased estimation results (Abdallah, Goergen, & O'Sullivan, 2015, Blundell & Bond, 
1998). 
In Panel 3, I use the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of residuals to test for first-order 
correlation and second-order correlation in the residuals. I use the Sargan test to confirm the 
validity of the instruments. I report the p-values of the first-order (m1) and second-order (m2) 
Arellano-Bond test and the Sargan test at the bottom of the Panel. The regression results of the 
dynamic panel regressions with difference- GMM are correct and credible only when there are 




valid (Chen, 2010). In the dynamic panel regressions, I use firm age variable mostly as the 
predetermined variable, which is determined by the firm’s year of establishment and is prior to 
the current period. I include all other independent variable and control variables as well as the 
interaction terms between independent variable and moderator variables mostly as endogenous 
variables, because the values of these variables are determined or influenced by other variables 
within the regression models. I firstly perform the analysis with the opaqueness index as the 
dependent variable and the results are displayed in Table 1 of Panel 3. Models in Column (1) 
include hierarchical complexity as the endogenous independent variable and its maximum three 
period lagged values as the instruments. The coefficient estimate on hierarchical complexity is 
positive and significant (α=0.0181, p=0.037). The p-value of the second-order Arellano-Bond 
test for autocorrelation is 0.095 which cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
autocorrelation in residuals. The p-value of the Sargan test is 0.143 which cannot reject the null 
assumption that all instruments are valid. The results suggest that the opaqueness index could 
be positively related to hierarchical complexity. 
Models in Column (2) and (3) include the interactions between hierarchical complexity and 
corporate diversification. The interaction terms between the hierarchical complexity variable 
and corporate diversification variables are regarded as endogenous and the maximum three 
period lagged values are used as instruments. The results show that the coefficient estimate on 
the interaction term between hierarchical complexity and related corporate diversification is 
negative but slightly insignificant (α=-0.0371, p=0.077). The p-value of the second-order 
Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation is 0.362, which shows that there is no autocorrelation in 
residuals. The p-value of the Sargan test is 0.751, which cannot reject the assumption that all 
instruments are valid. In terms of the moderating effect of unrelated corporate diversification, 
the coefficient estimate of the interaction term in Column (3) is insignificant (α=-0.0281, 




weak but insignificant influence on the linkage between hierarchical complexity and the 





Panel 3: Robustness test results using dynamic panel GMM regressions 
Table 1 of Panel 3. Regressions of the opaqueness index using dynamic panel GMM regressions 
Regression of the opaqueness index on hierarchical complexity, the related corporate diversification entropy variable, the unrelated corporate 
diversification entropy variable and their interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Opaqueness index Opaqueness index Opaqueness index 
L.Opaqueness 
index 
0.2872*** 0.2662** 0.1327 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.052) 
    







    







    







    







    
Capital 
expenditure 
-0.0015 -0.0746* -0.0520* 
 (0.943) (0.011) (0.035) 
    
    
    




Table 1 of Panel 3. Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Opaqueness index Opaqueness index Opaqueness index 
Book-to-market 
ratio 
-0.0115 0.0190 0.0457 
 (0.806) (0.710) (0.283) 
Research & 
Development 
0.0000 0.0024 0.0020* 
 (0.967) (0.054) (0.048) 
    







    
Scaled Amihud 
illiquidity 
0.0014 -0.0001 0.0002 
 (0.687) (0.909) (0.862) 
    
Hierarchical 
complexity 
0.0181* 0.0168 0.0231 
 (0.037) (0.054) (0.052) 
    
L. Firm age  -0.1660 -0.3592** 




    
L. Firm size  0.0379  
   
(0.243) 
 
    
L. Capital 
expenditure 
 0.0008 0.0218 
  (0.978) (0.448) 
    




Table 1 of Panel 3. Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Opaqueness index Opaqueness index Opaqueness index 
L. Research & 
Development 
 -0.0014 -0.0022** 
  (0.063) (0.002) 
    
L. Share price  -0.0002 -0.0001 








 0.1428  
  (0.164)  






 -0.0371  
  (0.077)  




  -0.0435 
   (0.660) 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    




Table 1 of Panel 3. Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) 






  -0.0281 
   (0.131) 
m1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
m2 0.095 0.362 0.548 
Sargan test (P-
value) 
0.143 0.751 0.875 
N 1712 1496 1460 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-values based on robust-standard errors are in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Note: In this section of analysis, the interaction between hierarchical complexity and home country institutional environment variable and host country 
institutional environment variables are not included in the models due to data unavailability in 2016. Specifically, the data of the home country institutional 
environment variable and host country institutional environment variables cover the 4-year period from 2012 to 2015. Thus, after taking the difference, the 
Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation results could not be calculated because the maximum number of observations per group is 2. In the table above, m1 and 




Next, I perform the analysis with the information transparency of firms as the dependent 
variable and the results are displayed in Table 2 of Panel 3. Models in Column (1) of Table 2 
regard hierarchical complexity as the endogenous independent variable and use its one period 
lagged values as the instrument. The results show that the coefficient estimate on hierarchical 
complexity is negative and significant (α=-0.7002, p=0.043), with the p-value of the second-
order autocorrelation test to be 0.982 and the Sargan test to be 0.170 which cannot reject the 
null assumptions that there is no autocorrelation in residuals and all instruments are valid. Thus, 
increases in hierarchical complexity could reduce the level of information transparency of firms.  
Models in Column (2) and (3) include the interaction terms between the hierarchical 
complexity variable and corporate diversification entropy variables. The interaction terms 
between the hierarchical complexity variable and corporate diversification entropy variables 
are endogenous and maximum three period lagged values are used as the instruments. In terms 
of related corporate diversification, the results in Column (2) show that the coefficient estimate 
on the moderating term is insignificant (α=-0.7710, p=0.160), suggesting that increases in 
related corporate diversification could not significantly influence the relationship between 
hierarchical complexity and information transparency.  
The results in Column (3) show that the coefficient estimate on the moderating term regarding 
unrelated corporate diversification is insignificant (α=0.4361, p=0.229). Thus, the results 
suggest that the degree of unrelated corporate diversifications cannot effectively moderate the 






Panel 3: Robustness test results using dynamic panel GMM regressions 
Table 2 of Panel 3. Regressions of information transparency using dynamic panel GMM regressions 
Regression of information transparency on hierarchical complexity, the related corporate diversification entropy variable, the unrelated corporate 
diversification entropy variable and their interactions 









0.1714 0.0245 -0.0315 
 (0.096) (0.692) (0.630) 
    







    







    







    







    







    
    




Table 2 of Panel 3. Continued 












    
Capital 
expenditure 
1.7740** 0.5192 0.2278 
 (0.008) (0.054) (0.466) 
    
L. Capital 
expenditure 
-1.7990 0.2850 0.3750 
 (0.067) (0.420) (0.347) 
    
Book-to-market 
ratio 
0.5431 0.3464 0.6250 
 (0.714) (0.725) (0.562) 
    
L. Book-to-
market ratio 
6.2035*** 6.0683*** 5.3149*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Research & 
Development 
-0.0113 -0.0110 -0.0067 
 (0.704) (0.411) (0.655) 
    
L. Research & 
Development 
0.0913* -0.0036 -0.0029 
 (0.031) (0.806) (0.845) 
    
    
    




Table 2 of Panel 3. Continued 














    







    
Scaled Amihud 
illiquidity 
-0.3495* -0.1059 -0.1725** 
 (0.013) (0.081) (0.005) 




-0.4305* -0.2456* -0.1701 
 (0.010) (0.017) (0.114) 
    







    
Hierarchical 
complexity 
-0.7002* 0.1114 0.0294 
 (0.043) (0.558) (0.895) 
    
L. Firm age  1.7870 1.4644 




    
    




Table 2 of Panel 3. Continued 










 0.5503  
  (0.870)  




 0.9193  
  (0.638)  






 -0.7710  
  (0.160)  




  2.6211 
   (0.334) 




  -0.2152 
   (0.920) 
    
    
    
    




Table 2 of Panel 3. Continued 












  0.4361 
   (0.229) 
m1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
m2 0.982 0.620 0.972 
Sargan test (P-
value) 
0.170 0.062 0.059 
N 1571 1454 1408 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-values based on robust-standard errors are in parentheses 











5.4.3 Reverse causality checks 
In this section, I check for the presence of reverse causality in the relationship between 
hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness and perform additional robustness tests to 
address reverse causality. I firstly examine whether the linkage between hierarchical 
complexity and corporate opaqueness suffers from reverse causality through two ways. One 
way is to use the hierarchical complexity variable as the dependent variable and regress the 
hierarchical complexity variable on opaqueness variables. The second way is to use the firms’ 
change of dividends paying as the moderator to check for the presence of reverse causality. 
The results are displayed in Panel 4. 
Table 1 in Panel 4 shows the results by regressing the hierarchical complexity variable on 
opaqueness variables. Models in Column (1) includes the opaqueness index as the independent 
variable. The results show that the coefficient estimate on the opaqueness index is positive and 
significant (α=0.5180, p=0.030), suggesting that the hierarchical complexity variable could 
also be related to the opaqueness index variable and thus reverse causality can exist in the 
relationship between the opaqueness index variable and the hierarchical complexity variable.  
Models in Column (2) use information transparency as the independent variable. It can be seen 
from the results that the coefficient estimate on information transparency is insignificant (α=-
0.0141, p=0.455), which suggests that the hierarchical complexity variable is not significantly 
related to the information transparency variable and thus the relationship between the 
information transparency variable and the hierarchical complexity variable does not suffer from 
reverse causality.  
Conclusively, the results in Table 1 of Panel 4 suggest that the hierarchical complexity variable 
is positively and significantly related to the opaqueness index. Thus, the results indicate that 




directional. I perform robustness tests to further check for the presence of reverse causality in 







Panel 4: Robustness test results checking for the presence of reverse causality 
Table 1 of Panel 4. Checking for reverse causality using regressions of the hierarchical complexity variable on corporate opaqueness 
variables 
Regressions of hierarchical complexity on the opaqueness index and information transparency 







0.5180*   
 (0.030)   
    





    





    





    
Capital 
expenditure 
-0.0381  -0.0333 
 (0.330)  (0.391) 
    
Book-to-market 
ratio 
0.3719**  0.3561** 
 (0.004)  (0.006) 
    
    




Table 1 of Panel 4. Continued 







0.0005  0.0005 
 (0.686)  (0.711) 
    





    
Scaled Amihud 
illiquidity 
-0.0035  -0.0044 
 (0.778)  (0.732) 
    





    
Information 
transparency 
  -0.0141 
   (0.455) 
Year fixed-
effects 
Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed-
effects 
Yes  Yes 
N 3470  3462 
F 38.003  38.071 
p 0.000  0.000 
p-values based on robust-standard errors are in parentheses 





Next, I use the change of dividends of firms as the moderator to further check for the presence 
of reverse causality in the relationship between hierarchical complexity and corporate 
opaqueness. Previous studies show that dividends are an effective way to reduce the level of 
firm opaqueness. Increasing dividend payouts alleviates agency conflicts between firms and 
outside investors and thus reduces firm opaqueness (Jensen, 1986, Lang & Litzenberger, 1989, 
Morris & Roseman, 2015). Therefore, in this study, I use the change of dividends as the 
moderator to check whether reverse causality exists in the relationship between hierarchical 
complexity and firm opaqueness. 
I calculate the sample firms’ change of dividends within the sample years. I use dummy 
variables to indicate the change of dividends. In terms of the increases of firms’ dividends 
paying, I use value 1 to indicate that there is an increase in dividend payout while value 0 
indicates the situations otherwise. Similarly, in terms of decreases of dividend payout, I use 
value 1 to indicate that there is a decrease and value 0 indicates the situations otherwise. In this 
additional test, I include firm growth as the control variable to control for the product and 
investment growth factors that may affect the paying of dividends (Morris & Roseman, 2015). 
The firm growth variable is calculated as the annual percentage change of total assets.  
The second approach for checking reverse causality using dividends consists of two parts. 
Models in Part 1 regress opaqueness variables on the hierarchical complexity variable with 
changes of dividends as the moderators. Models in Part 2 regress the hierarchical complexity 
variable on the opaqueness index and information transparency with changes of dividends 
payouts as the moderators so as to examine whether opaqueness variables can affect the 
hierarchical complexity variable in a reverse direction. The results are displayed in Table 2 and 




Models in Column (1) and (2) of Table 2 include the opaqueness index and information 
transparency as the dependent variable and use increases in dividends as the moderator. The 
results in Column (1) show that the coefficient estimate on the interaction term between 
hierarchical complexity and increases in dividends is negative and significant (α=-0.0129, 
p=0.000) which suggests that increasing dividends can effectively reduce the level of the 
opaqueness index due to hierarchical complexity. When using information transparency as the 
dependent variable, the results in Column (2) show that the coefficient estimate on the 
interaction term between hierarchical complexity and increases in dividends is insignificant 
(α=-0.0140, p=0.573). Thus, the results suggest that increases in dividends cannot significantly 
increase the level of information transparency of firms. 
Models in Column (3) and (4) include the opaqueness index and information transparency as 
the dependent variable and use decreases in dividends as moderators. The results in Column 
(3) and (4) show that by using the opaqueness index and information transparency as the 
dependent variables, the coefficient estimates are insignificant in terms of the interaction term 
between hierarchical complexity and decreases in dividends (α=-0.0021, p=0.497; α=0.0040, 
p=0.874, respectively). Thus, the results suggest that decreases in dividends do not affect the 




Panel 4: Robustness test results checking for the presence of reverse causality 
Table 2 of Panel 4. Checking for reverse causality using dividends, part 1 of 2 
Regression of the opaqueness index and information transparency on hierarchical complexity, increases of dividends paying, decreases of 
dividends paying and their interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Opaqueness index Information  
transparency 




0.0094*** -0.0061 0.0053* -0.0149 
 (0.000) (0.749) (0.029) (0.432) 
     
Dividends_ 
increase 
0.0534*** -0.1209   
 (0.000) (0.187)   




-0.0129*** -0.0140   
 (0.000) (0.573)   
     









     









     









     




Table 2 of Panel 4. Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Opaqueness index Information  
transparency 




0.0018 0.0621 0.0016 0.0614 
 (0.779) (0.197) (0.794) (0.205) 
     
Book-to-market 
ratio 
-0.0556*** 0.9192*** -0.0584*** 0.9335*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Research & 
Development 
-0.0001 -0.0016 -0.0001 -0.0016 
 (0.708) (0.349) (0.698) (0.352) 
     









     
Scaled Amihud 
illiquidity 
-0.0013 -0.0099 -0.0014 -0.0100 
 (0.260) (0.446) (0.234) (0.437) 
     









     









     
     
     




Table 2 of Panel 4. Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Opaqueness index Information  
transparency 




  0.0343** 0.0853 
   (0.003) (0.412) 





  -0.0021 0.0040 
   (0.497) (0.874) 
Year fixed-
effects 
             Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed- 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3454 3446 3454 3446 
F 12.573 48.719 12.049 48.595 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-values based on robust-standard errors are in parentheses 




Next, I use hierarchical complexity as the dependent variable and corporate opaqueness as the 
independent variable. I regress the hierarchical complexity variable on the opaqueness index 
and information transparency with changes in dividends as the moderators. The results are 
displayed in Table 3 of Panel 4. 
Models in Column (1) and (2) include the opaqueness index as the independent variable while 
models in Column (3) and (4) include information transparency as the independent variable. 
Results from Column (1) and (2) show that the coefficient estimates on the interaction terms 
between the opaqueness index and increasing and decreasing dividends paying are insignificant 
(α=-0.5900, p=0.319; α=-1.0111, p=0.146, respectively). Moreover, results from Column (3) 
and (4) show that the coefficient estimates on the interaction terms between information 
transparency and increasing and decreasing dividends paying are insignificant (α=-0.0154, 
p=0.717; α=-0.0796, p=0.163, respectively). These results suggest that, on average, corporate 
opaqueness cannot effectively cause hierarchical complexity. However, it can be seen from the 
models in Column (1) and (2) that the coefficient estimates on the opaqueness index are 
positive and significant (α=0.6013, p=0.013; α=0.6205, p=0.010, respectively), which suggests 
that the opaqueness index can positively influence the hierarchical complexity variable to some 
extent.  
Therefore, it can be seen that the two approaches provide mixed results in terms of reverse 
causality. Specifically, results from the first approach which regresses hierarchical complexity 
on the opaqueness index and information transparency indicate that the relationship between 
hierarchical complexity and the opaqueness index can be bi-directional. However, results from 
the second approach using dividends suggest that, on average, corporate opaqueness cannot 
effectively lead to hierarchical complexity. This can be seen from the results that the changes 
of dividends paying cannot significantly affect the relationship between the hierarchical 




the opaqueness index can affect the hierarchical complexity variable to some extent. In this 
case, generally, the results above cannot reject that there is no reverse causality in the 
relationship between hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness variables. Thus, I 











Panel 4: Robustness test results checking for the presence of reverse causality 
Table 3 of Panel 4. Checking for reverse causality using dividends, part 2 of 2 
Regression of hierarchical complexity on the opaqueness index and information transparency, increases of dividends paying, decreases of 
dividends paying and their interactions 











0.6013* 0.6205**   
 (0.013) (0.010)   
     
Dividends_ 
increase 
0.4951  0.1925  
 (0.167)  (0.066)  




-0.5900    
 (0.319)    
     









     









     









     




Table 3 of Panel 4. Continued 











-0.0391 -0.0398 -0.0347 -0.0344 
 (0.317) (0.312) (0.371) (0.377) 
     
Book to market 
ratio 
0.3891** 0.3668** 0.3740** 0.3512** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
     
Research & 
Development 
0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 
 (0.657) (0.647) (0.676) (0.679) 
     









     
Scaled Amihud 
illiquidity 
-0.0032 -0.0044 -0.0042 -0.0039 
 (0.795) (0.729) (0.746) (0.763) 
     









     









     
     
     




Table 3 of Panel 4. Continued 











 0.6747  0.2252 
  (0.109)  (0.092) 




 -1.0111   
  (0.146)   
     
Transparency   -0.0097 -0.0043 








  -0.0154  
   (0.717)  




   -0.0796 
    (0.163) 
Year fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3454 3454 3446 3446 
F 30.239 31.200 30.385 31.117 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-values based on robust-standard errors are in parentheses 




The results in the prior section suggest that reverse causality can exist in the relationship 
between hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness to some extent. Thus, I perform 
additional robustness tests to address reverse causality. In this section, I use the orthogonal 
approach to address the reverse causality problem.  
I investigate the relationship between hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness by 
orthogonalizing the complexity variable. The orthogonalized hierarchical complexity variable 
can exclude the factors in opaqueness variables that may affect the hierarchical complexity 
variable. Thus, employing orthogonalized hierarchical complexity in the models allows me to 
examine whether the level of firm opaqueness is affected only by hierarchical complexity. 
Second, I use the changes of dividends paying of firms to check whether hierarchical 
complexity varies with the level of firm opaqueness and then examine the relationship between 
hierarchical complexity and opaqueness by excluding reverse causality between the two 
variables. 
First, I orthogonalize hierarchical complexity by regressing the complexity variable at time t 
on opaqueness index variable at time t-1 and t-2. I then extract the residuals from the models. 
In the regressions, the unobservable factors in the opaqueness index variable that do not affect 
the complexity variable are included in the error term, and thus I use the residuals from the 
regressions to capture the part of hierarchical complexity that is not affected by the opaqueness 
index. Second, I then include residuals into the models as the independent variable and regress 
the opaqueness index on the residuals. In this section of analysis, the sample number N becomes 
smaller because I use lagged opaqueness variables in the regression that produced these 
residuals. I perform similar steps for the information transparency variable. The results are 




Models in Column (1) include the opaqueness index as the dependent variable. It can be seen 
from the results that the coefficient estimate on residuals is insignificant (α=-0.0006, p=0.861) 
which suggests that the opaqueness index does not vary with hierarchical complexity. Models 
in Column (2) use information transparency as the dependent variable. The results show that 
the coefficient estimate on residuals is negative and significant (α=-0.0806, p=0.047), 
suggesting that information transparency is negatively associated with hierarchical complexity. 
In conclusion, the models above remove the influence of reverse causality between the 
complexity variable and firm opaqueness variables by excluding unobservable factors in firm 
opaqueness variables that affect hierarchical complexity. After excluding the influence of 
corporate opaqueness on complexity, the results show that firms’ level of information 
transparency decreases with greater hierarchical complexity. Thus, from the perspective of 













Panel 5: Robustness test results addressing reverse causality using the orthogonal approach 
Table 1 of Panel 5. Addressing reverse causality using orthogonalized hierarchical complexity 
Regression of the opaqueness index and information transparency on orthogonalized hierarchical complexity 
 (1) (2) 






 (0.861)  
   





   





   









 (0.774) (0.209) 




 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
   




Table 1 of Panel 5. Continued 
 (1) (2) 





 (0.345) (0.083) 
   









 (0.463) (0.006) 
   

















N 2266 1951 
F 20.914 42.195 
p 0.000 0.000 
p-values based on robust-standard errors are in parentheses 






5.4.4 Sensitivity checks 
In this section, I perform additional tests using alternative dependent variables to examine the 
robustness of the results in the previous analysis. In the sensitivity checks, I use the 
idiosyncratic risk of the firms and the R2 values which are drawn from market model 
regressions as the alternative measures of firm opaqueness. The lagged explanatory variables 
are used in the analysis of this section. 
Idiosyncratic risk reflects the degree of idiosyncratic volatility of the firms’ stock prices 
(Ferreira & Laux, 2007). Higher idiosyncratic risk and volatility suggest that there is a greater 
synchronicity of prices and returns between firms’ stock and the market index. High 
idiosyncratic volatility is associated with more efficient capital allocation and more optimized 
equity structures. Moreover, higher idiosyncratic volatility also indicates that the stock prices 
contain more information about the firms’ future earnings and reflect larger amount of firm 
specific information (Aabo, Pantzalis, & Park, 2015, Durnev, Morck, Yeung, & Zarowin, 2003, 
Ferreira & Laux, 2007). This is because in the market model, when stock prices move more 
synchronously with the prices of the market index, less idiosyncratic risk and volatility contain 
less amount of firm specific information and firms can thus become more opaque and less 
transparent to outside investors (Durnev, Errunza, & Molchanov, 2009, Morck, Yeung, & Yu, 
2000). In addition, the values of R2 from the market model indicate the degree of synchronicity 
between firms’ stock returns and the market index returns. Therefore, it follows that an increase 
in opaqueness is related to lower idiosyncratic risk and to higher R2 (Aabo, Pantzalis, & Park, 
2015).  
First, I use the idiosyncratic risk of firms as the alternative indicator of corporate opaqueness. 
Table 1 of Panel 6 displays the regression results using idiosyncratic risk as the dependent 
variable. In Table 1, the model in Column (1) examines the baseline hypothesis by including 




coefficient estimate on hierarchical complexity is negative and significant (α=-0.0540, 
p=0.000). Since lower idiosyncratic risk is associated with a higher level of firm opaqueness, 
the results suggest that hierarchical complexity can increase the level of opaqueness of firms.  
Column (2) through (6) in Table 1 of Panel 6 investigate the moderating effects of firms’ 
corporate diversifications, home country institutional environment quality and host country 
institutional environment quality. I start from examining the moderating effect of firms’ 
corporate diversifications. As is displayed in Column (2) and (3), the coefficient estimate of 
the interaction term between hierarchical complexity and the related corporate diversification 
entropy variable is positive and significant (α=0.1158, p=0.000) and the coefficient estimate 
on the interaction term, in terms of unrelated corporate diversification, is positive and 
significant (α=0.0845, p=0.002). Thus, the results suggest that increases in related corporate 
diversifications could mitigate the relationship between hierarchical complexity and firm 
opaqueness. The results also suggest that increases in unrelated corporate diversification   
cannot strengthen the relationship. 
In terms of the effect of the home country institutional environment quality, results in Column 
(4) show that the coefficient estimate on the moderating term between hierarchical complexity 
and the home country institutional environment is insignificant (α=-0.1876, p=0.063), which 
suggests that improvement in the quality of the home country institutional environment could 
not significantly influence the relationship between hierarchical complexity and corporate 
opaqueness.  
Columns (5) through (6) present the moderating effect of the indicators used to proxy host 
country institutional environments quality. It can be seen from the results in Column (5) that 
the coefficient estimate on the interaction terms between hierarchical complexity and the total 




(α=0.0259, p=0.001). Moreover, results from Column (6) show that the coefficient estimate is 
positive and significant in terms of the moderating term between hierarchical complexity and 
the employee number-based host country institutional environment variable (α=0.0253, 
p=0.002). The results suggest that stronger regulations of the host countries where subsidiaries 
are located can significantly weaken the relationship between hierarchical complexity and the 




Panel 6: Robustness test results using alternative dependent variables 
Table 1 of Panel 6. Results of regressions using idiosyncratic risk 
Regression of idiosyncratic risk on lagged hierarchical complexity, lagged related corporate diversification entropy variable, lagged unrelated 
corporate diversification entropy variable, lagged home country institutional environment variable, lagged host country institutional environment 
variables and their interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Idiosyncratic risk Idiosyncratic risk Idiosyncratic risk Idiosyncratic risk Idiosyncratic risk Idiosyncratic risk 
L. Hierarchical 
complexity 
-0.0540*** -0.0825*** -0.0747*** 0.0440 -0.0693*** -0.0707*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.403) (0.000) (0.000) 
       













       













       













       
L. Capital 
expenditure 
0.0928** 0.0920** 0.0906** 0.0930** 0.0897** 0.0895** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
L. Book-to-
market ratio 
0.2980*** 0.2748*** 0.2956*** 0.3005*** 0.3115*** 0.3284*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
       




Table 1 of Panel 6. Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Idiosyncratic risk Idiosyncratic risk Idiosyncratic risk Idiosyncratic risk Idiosyncratic risk Idiosyncratic risk 
L. Research & 
Development 
-0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.919) (0.824) (0.847) (0.892) (0.947) (0.937) 
       

















-0.0071 -0.0040 -0.0048 -0.0070 -0.0069 -0.0063 
 (0.337) (0.596) (0.521) (0.348) (0.349) (0.386) 
       

















 -0.4672***     
  (0.000)     






 0.1158***     
  (0.000)     
       
       
       




Table 1 of Panel 6. Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




  -0.4493***    
   (0.000)    






  0.0845**    
   (0.002)    





   0.8564   
    (0.470)   






   -0.1876   
    (0.063)   
       
L. Host country 
institutional 
environment 
    -0.1431***  
     (0.001)  
       
       




Table 1 of Panel 6. Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






    0.0259**  
     (0.001)  




     -0.1386** 
      (0.002) 






     0.0253** 
      (0.002) 
Year fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2534 2435 2399 2534 2534 2534 
F 252.770 210.950 212.280 210.180 212.170 212.330 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-values based on robust-standard errors are in parentheses 






Second, I perform the sensitivity tests using R2 as the dependent variable. Table 2 of Panel 6 
reports the results by regressing R2 on lagged independent variables, lagged control variables 
and lagged moderator variables. 
As is shown in the results in Column (1), the coefficient estimates on hierarchical complexity 
are significantly positive (α=0.0094, p=0.000) which suggests that hierarchical complexity is 
positively related to firm opaqueness. Thus, the results are consistent with findings which are 
reported in previous analysis. 
I then include the related and unrelated corporate diversification entropy variable into the 
models so as to examine the impact of firms’ corporate diversifications on the relationship 
between hierarchical complexity and opaqueness. Results in Column (2) show that the 
coefficient estimate on the interaction term between hierarchical complexity and the related 
diversification entropy variable is insignificant (α=-0.0062, p=0.314), while the coefficient 
estimate on the interaction term regarding unrelated diversification in Column (3) is negative 
and significant (α=-0.0139, p=0.009). The results indicate that firms’ engagement in related 
corporate diversifications cannot effectively weaken the linkage between hierarchical 
complexity and opaqueness. The results also suggest that firms’ increases in unrelated 
corporate diversification cannot strengthen such a relationship.  
Models in Column (4) include the home country institutional environment variable. As is 
shown in the results, the coefficient estimate on the moderation term between hierarchical 
complexity and the home country institutions variable is negative but insignificant (α=-0.0003, 
p=0.986). The results suggest that improvement in the quality of the home country institutional 





Column (5) through Column (6) report the results by including host country institution 
variables into the models. As is displayed in the results, the coefficient estimates are 
significantly negative on the interaction terms between hierarchical complexity and host 
country institution variables (α=-0.0050, p=0.009; α=-0.0043, p=0.026, respectively). Thus, 
the results are consistent with previous findings, suggesting that improved host country 
institutions with strict regulatory policies and transparent institutional environment can 
significantly reduce firm opaqueness due to hierarchical complexity.  
Generally, the results and findings in the tests above remain consistent and quantitatively the 





Panel 6: Robustness test results using alternative dependent variables 
Table 2 of Panel 6. Results of regressions using R2 
Regression of R2 on lagged hierarchical complexity, lagged related corporate diversification entropy variable, lagged unrelated corporate 
diversification entropy variable, lagged home country institutional environment variable, lagged host country institutional environment variables 
and their interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 R2 R2 R2 R2 R2 R2 
L. Hierarchical 
complexity 
0.0094*** 0.0104*** 0.0118*** 0.0096 0.0104*** 0.0114*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.358) (0.000) (0.000) 
       













       













       













       
L. Capital 
expenditure 
-0.0043 -0.0039 -0.0035 -0.0043 -0.0035 -0.0036 
 (0.209) (0.263) (0.323) (0.210) (0.297) (0.292) 
       
L. Book-to-
market ratio 
-0.0691*** -0.0684*** -0.0757*** -0.0690*** -0.0720*** -0.0758*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
       




Table 2 of Panel 6. Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 R2 R2 R2 R2 R2 R2 
L. Research & 
Development 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.253) (0.257) (0.274) (0.256) (0.293) (0.281) 
       

















0.0006 0.0003 0.0003 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 
 (0.421) (0.703) (0.638) (0.424) (0.417) (0.530) 
       

















 0.0499*     
  (0.012)     






 -0.0062     
  (0.314)     
       
       
       




Table 2 of Panel 6. Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




  0.0990***    
   (0.000)    






  -0.0139**    
   (0.009)    





   -0.0288   
    (0.895)   






   -0.0003   
    (0.986)   
       
L. Host country 
institutional 
environment 
    0.0404***  
     (0.000)  
       
       




Table 2 of Panel 6. Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






    -0.0050**  
     (0.009)  




     0.0304*** 
      (0.000) 






     -0.0043* 
      (0.026) 
Year fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2534 2435 2399 2534 2534 2534 
F 136.070 111.960 116.840 114.100 118.080 115.040 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-values based on robust-standard errors are in parentheses 








In this section, I discuss the results on the relationship between hierarchical complexity and 
corporate opaqueness and the robustness tests. In order to better discuss the results above, I 
provide tables that summarize all these results from different tests. Table 5.4 presents the 
results on whether the hypotheses are supported from different tests, Table 5.5 presents the 
results in terms of reverse causality tests. 
Table 5.4 Results of hypotheses based on different tests 
 





























c risk R2 
Hypothesis 1 Supported Partly 
supported 
Supported Supported Supported 


































Generally, the analyses performed above show that hierarchical complexity is positively related 
to the corporate opaqueness of firms. Based on the empirical analysis results, Hypothesis 1 is 
supported which indicates that firms’ higher degree of hierarchical complexity is positively 
associated with increasing corporate opaqueness. Hierarchical complexity decreases the 
quantity and quality of firm-specific information obtained by outside investors which makes 




Hypothesis 2a posits that a higher degree of related corporate diversification mitigates the 
relationship between hierarchical complexity and opaqueness. Results, including related 
corporate diversification, find partial support for Hypothesis 2a. First, in both the main analysis 
and the robustness tests using fixed effect interactions, results in terms of Hypothesis 2a are 
significant with the opaqueness index as the dependent variable. Second, in the robustness tests, 
results are moderately significant in the dynamic panel regression models with the opaqueness 
index as the dependent variable. Moreover, results are also significant in the sensitivity tests 
using idiosyncratic risk as the dependent variable. Therefore, the results show Hypothesis 2a 
is partly supported, suggesting that increases in related corporate diversification could mitigate 
the relationship between hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness to a limited extent. 
Further, the graph in Figure 1 shows that the moderating effect of related corporate 
diversification on the relationship between hierarchical complexity and the opaqueness index 
is more pronounced with more complex firms. This is because firm specific information of 
more complex firms tends to be less accessible to outside investors due to a higher degree of 
hierarchical complexity which makes complex firms become more opaque and less transparent. 
In this case, increases in related corporate diversification could help release relatively larger 
amounts of firm specific information to outsiders, since business information among related 
business and industry segments shares more commonalities when firms have related corporate 
diversification. This reduces the costs and difficulty for management and analysts to analyse 
the firm. Such reduced difficulty in analysing firm activities and performance could be more 
noticeable and valuable when it comes to more complex firms which are more opaque. Thus, 
the mitigating impact of related corporate diversification on the relationship between 
hierarchical complexity and the opaqueness index is more pronounced in more complex firms. 
Following this, results from the previous analysis do not find evidence for Hypothesis 2b which 




between hierarchical complexity and opaqueness. This may be because the effect of 
hierarchical complexity which prevents management from being comprehensively informed of 
firm operations and performance is already strong and thus compared with such an effect, the 
roles played by unrelated corporate diversification in increasing the difficulty for management 
to process and analyse firm operations and performance may not be that significant. Therefore, 
the impact of unrelated corporate diversification on the relationship between hierarchical 
complexity and opaqueness is not significant or evident. 
Hypothesis 3 posits that increasing the quality of the home country institutional environment 
weakens the relationship between hierarchical complexity and opaqueness. However, results 
from the models, including the home country institutional environment variable as the 
moderator variable, show that Hypothesis 3 is not supported. Results on the interaction term 
between hierarchical complexity and the home country institutional environment are 
insignificant in the main analysis and remain insignificant in the robustness tests. This is 
because the imperceptible and subtle influence from the state institutional environment is not 
effective and powerful enough to motivate firms to mitigate the information asymmetry 
between firms and outside investors. Moreover, the regulations from the individual state 
government may not be so strong as to make firms increase information disclosure to outsiders. 
Thus, the results do not provide evidence on the hypothesis that increases in the quality of the 
home country institutional environment could weaken the relationship between hierarchical 
complexity and the corporate opaqueness of firms. 
Moreover, Hypothesis 4 states that improving the quality of the host country institutional 
environment can weaken the relationship between hierarchical complexity and opaqueness. 
The investigations into the moderating effect of the host country institutional environment 
quality show that Hypothesis 4 is supported. Results on the interaction terms between 




in the main analysis with the opaqueness index and information transparency as the dependent 
variables. The results are also significant in the robustness tests with the opaqueness index and 
idiosyncratic risk as the dependent variables. Thus, the results suggest that increasing the 
quality of the host country institutional environment represented by more strict regulatory 
policies and transparent institutions can effectively weaken the relationship between 
hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness. Improvements in the quality of the host 
country institutions provide stronger regulations on company behaviours and this reduces 
corporate opaqueness and increases the transparency of firms. Further, the graph in Figure 2 
shows that the mitigating impact of the host country institutional environment quality on the 
relationship between hierarchical complexity and opaqueness is more evident with less 
complex firms. This is because compared to more complex firms, it is easier and more practical 
for regulating authorities to monitor and regulate the behaviours of less complex firms, since 
there could be less regulation barriers and auditing difficulties for less complex firms. Thus, 
the moderating effect of the quality of the host country institutional environment on the 
relationship between hierarchical complexity and opaqueness is more pronounced with less 
complex firms.   
Further, in terms of reverse causality in the relationship between hierarchical complexity and 
corporate opaqueness, Table 5.5 displays the results of the related robustness tests that examine 









Table 5.5 Reverse causality checks 
 
                                




complexity as the 
dependent variable 
Test 2: 
Using changes of dividends 
paying as the moderator 




In the robustness test section, I perform additional robustness tests to check and address reverse 
causality in the relationship between hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness. I 
employ two approaches to check for the existence of reverse causality. The first approach uses 
hierarchical complexity as the dependent variable and regresses the hierarchical complexity 
variable on the opaqueness index variable and information transparency variable. The second 
approach uses the changes of dividends paying as moderator to check for the presence of 
reverse causality. It can be seen from Table 5.5 that the two approaches provide mixed results.  
Specifically, in terms of the first approach, regressing the hierarchical complexity variable on 
the opaqueness index variable and information transparency variable, the results on the 
opaqueness index are significant. Thus, the results suggest that the relationship between 
hierarchical complexity and the opaqueness index can be bi-directional. In other words, 
increases in hierarchical complexity are related to a greater opaqueness index, while increasing 
the opaqueness index is also associated with a higher degree of hierarchical complexity. 
However, in the second approach using changes of dividends as the moderator, results in Part 
1 suggest that increases in dividends paying can significantly mitigate the linkage between 
hierarchical complexity and the opaqueness index. Following this, results in Part 2 further 
reveal that when using hierarchical complexity as the dependent variable, results are 




paying. Thus, although the results provide some evidence suggesting that the opaqueness index 
can influence hierarchical complexity to some extent, which can be seen from the significant 
results in Column (1) and (2) in Table 3 of Panel 4, the results of the second approach suggest 
that, on average, the opaqueness index cannot significantly lead to hierarchical complexity.  
In general, the mixed results in terms of reverse causality checks suggest that the relationship 
between hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness can be bi-directional at least to 
some extent. This is because it is possible that more opaque firms tend to become more 
hierarchically complex. When firms are opaque, outside investors’ limited access to firm 
specific information can provide the firm and controlling shareholders with opportunities to 
undertake tunnelling activities that expropriate the wealth of outside investors and minority 
shareholders. In particular, firms tend to have little motivation to pay the investment returns to 
investors because they can  use the corporate resources either for their own benefit or for the 
further growth (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2004). In this case, one 
effective way for firms to transfer corporate resources and expropriate outside investors’ wealth 
is to set up a larger number of self-owned intermediary subsidiary companies, since firms can 
legally take advantage of these intermediary companies to transfer corporate resources, such 
as assets and profits, to the controlling shareholders through undertaking related party 
transactions (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000, Shleifer, Vishny, La Porta, 
& Lopez-de-Silanes, 2000). In addition, apart from undertaking real transactions between 
related parties, firms can also hide and distort financial information through adding a number 
of companies into the their ownership linkages (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & 
Shleifer, 2000). Consequently, the tendency of getting involved in tunnelling and expropriation 
activities leads opaque firms to develop more complex hierarchical structures and have a higher 
degree of hierarchical complexity. Thus, it can be possible for more opaque firms to have 




Given that the relationship between hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness may be 
bi-directional, I perform additional robustness tests to address this issue. Through using the 
orthogonal approach, the results provide some evidence that increasing hierarchical complexity 
can lead to a reduced level of information transparency. Thus, after excluding the factors 
through which corporate opaqueness variables can affect hierarchical complexity, firms’ 
information transparency decreases with hierarchical complexity which is driven by the uni-































Chapter 6 Conclusions 
 
6.1 Conclusions 
In this thesis, I examine the impact of hierarchical complexity on corporate opaqueness and 
investigate the moderating effect of corporate diversification, the quality of the home country 
institutional environment and the host country institutional environment. I utilize a sample of 
U.S. firms from 42 industries to investigate the relationship between hierarchical complexity 
and corporate opaqueness. My descriptive analysis shows that hierarchical complexity is 
positively correlated to the opaqueness index and is negatively correlated to information 
transparency. I then perform multivariate analysis to examine the relationship between 
hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness. The empirical results show that hierarchical 
complexity is positively associated with the opaqueness index and is negatively associated with 
information transparency. These findings indicate that hierarchical complexity is positively 
related to corporate opaqueness. Following this, I then investigate the moderating impact of 
corporate diversification, the quality of the home country institutional environment and the 
host country institutional environment on the relationship between hierarchical complexity and 
opaqueness. In terms of the moderating effect of corporate diversification, the results show that 
related corporate diversification can mitigate the relationship between hierarchical complexity 
and opaqueness to some extent, while unrelated corporate diversification cannot significantly 
influence such a relationship. In terms of the effect of the home country institutional 
environment, the results indicate that increasing the quality of the home country institutional 
environment cannot significantly affect the relationship between hierarchical complexity and 
opaqueness. In regard to the moderating effect of the host country institutional environment, 
the results reveal that increasing the quality of the host country institutional environment 




Specifically, I first find a positive relationship between hierarchical complexity and corporate 
opaqueness. Increasing hierarchical complexity reduces the quality of outside investors’ 
information environment and increases the information asymmetry between the firms and 
outside investors, since less firm-specific information is accessible and available to outsiders. 
As a result, it can be difficult for outside investors to be aware of the firms’ activities. Thus, 
hierarchical complexity is found to be positively associated with firm opaqueness.  
Second, I investigate the impact of related and unrelated corporate diversification on the 
relationship between hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness. When firms have 
corporate diversifications in related industry segments, information similarities among firms’ 
industry and business segments can reduce the costs and difficulty for management and 
financial analysts to collect and analyse information which increases the quantity and quality 
of firm-specific information available to outside investors. Thus, related corporate 
diversification is found to be able to mitigate the linkage between hierarchical complexity and 
opaqueness to some extent. However, the results also show that the effect of related corporate 
diversification in alleviating the level of corporate opaqueness due to hierarchical complexity 
is limited. This can be seen in the results showing that Hypothesis 2a is only partly supported. 
This is because although related corporate diversification can reduce top management’s and 
analysts’ information processing difficulty and challenges to some extent, firms which expand 
business activities to more than one industry segment are more complex than focused firms. 
Thus, the roles played by related corporate diversification in mitigating the linkage between 
hierarchical complexity and opaqueness is limited.   
In terms of unrelated corporate diversification, the results do not provide empirical evidence 
that unrelated corporate diversification can strengthen the relationship between hierarchical 
complexity and opaqueness. This may be because the effect of hierarchical complexity in 




environment is already significant enough. Thus, although corporate diversification is found to 
be able to increase the information asymmetry between the firms and outside investors on the 
capital market, the effect of unrelated corporate diversification in decreasing the quality of the 
outside investors’ information environment might not be that significant compared with the 
impact brought by hierarchical complexity. Therefore, I do not find significant empirical 
evidence indicating that unrelated corporate diversification can strengthen the linkage between 
hierarchical complexity and opaqueness.        
Third, the results show that the quality of the home country institutional environment cannot 
effectively weaken the relationship between hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness. 
This is because despite federal states constantly promoting auditing independence and firm 
information disclosure, such regulatory policies and law enforcement at the federal state level 
in regulating firms’ behaviours and activities may not be that strong and obligatory. 
Additionally, the institutional environment quality may not be significantly different across 
different federal states. Thus, the regulation powers of the federal bodies in increasing firm 
transparency and improving the quality of outside investors’ information environment are not 
significant. Consequently, improvement in the quality of the home country institutional 
environment in the United States has no significant effect in mitigating the level of opaqueness 
caused by hierarchical complexity.  
Finally, the results provide evidence indicating that increasing the quality of the host country 
institutional environment can significantly weaken the relationship between hierarchical 
complexity and opaqueness. In particular, when firms have foreign subsidiaries which are 
located in countries with strict regulation policies and institutional rules, the strict regulatory 
policies, legal enforcement and the transparent institutional environment of the host country 




quality of the host country institutional environment is found to be able to significantly mitigate 
the linkage between hierarchical complexity and opaqueness.  
In summary, this thesis makes the following contributions to the existing literature. First, this 
thesis advances the research which examines the impact of organizational complexity on firms. 
As one important type of organizational complexity, hierarchical complexity reflects the 
complex hierarchical structural characteristics of the subsidiary companies of the firms. It also 
reflects the interactions of management and business operations and activities between the 
parent company and subsidiary companies as well as those among the subsidiary companies. 
Compared with previous literature which implicitly investigates organizational complexity 
from the perspectives of corporate diversification and international diversification (Bushman, 
Chen, Engel, & Smith, 2004, Duru & Reeb, 2002, Jennings, Seo, & Tanlu, 2014, Naveen, 2006), 
hierarchical complexity reveals the critical features of organizational complexity which 
corporate diversification and international diversification do not. Specifically, both types of 
diversification depend on the diversification of sales across industry divisions and geographical 
segments to reflect the organizational complexity of firms. While the diversification of sales 
can partly uncover some operational information about the firm’s complexity, such 
diversification only directly reflects the sales variety of the firm and cannot indicate the 
dimensions of organizational complexity that exist in the internal subsidiary structures of the 
firm. Hierarchical complexity which focuses on firms’ internal subsidiary structures reflects a 
more complete picture of the organizational complexity of firms. This is in keeping with the 
definition of organizational complexity which states that  organizational complexity is the 
differentiations and interactions of the internal components that constitute the organization 
(Dooley, 2002, Thompson, 1967). Hierarchical complexity more comprehensively reflects 
organizational complexity by capturing the complexity of the firms’ subsidiaries as well as 




subsidiaries ownership linkages. Thus, focusing on hierarchical complexity allows me to 
extend the empirical studies of organizational complexity. Therefore, this thesis contributes to 
the literature on organizational complexity and provides a more comprehensive understanding 
of firms’ complex hierarchical subsidiary structures.  
Second, this thesis contributes to the literature examining the impact of firms’ complex 
business and operational characteristics on information asymmetry between firms and outsiders 
on the capital market. Despite the importance of hierarchical complexity and corporate 
opaqueness, there are no prior studies that comprehensively examine the linkage between 
hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness. By revealing that increasing hierarchical 
complexity can increase the costs and difficulty for outside investors to access, process and 
analyse firm information, hierarchical complexity is shown to make it difficult for outsiders to 
be aware of the activities and performance of firms, causing them to become opaque and less 
transparent. Thus, by exploiting several features of the relationship between hierarchical 
complexity and corporate opaqueness, this study fills the void in literature by finding the 
positive relationship between hierarchical complexity and corporate opaqueness. Additionally, 
by providing evidence that complexity stemming from firms’ complex hierarchical structures 
is positively associated with corporate opaqueness, this thesis extends previous literature which 
finds that increases in firms’ international diversification can lead to greater information 
asymmetry between the firms and the capital market (Aabo, Pantzalis, & Park, 2015, Duru & 
Reeb, 2002). 
Third, this thesis provides some evidence on the controversies in the literature which 
investigates the influence of complex organizational forms on top management’s information 
availability and cognition capabilities. Although I do not directly examine the impact of 
hierarchical complexity on management behaviours of firms, this thesis provides some indirect 




management’s information availability and information processing capabilities by addressing 
hierarchical complexity, both conceptually and empirically. Specifically, the findings in this 
thesis show that increasing hierarchical complexity can aggravate management unrelatedness 
and information disconnections between the parent company management and subsidiary 
management which consequently deteriorates the parent company management’s information 
availability and information analysing and processing capabilities. Therefore, these findings 
provide support for and extend past studies which argue that firms’ hierarchical structures can 
reduce the parent company management information availability and hamper management’s 
information processing capabilities (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2002, Campbell, Datar, & Sandino, 
2009, Dikolli & Vaysman, 2006, Glenn & Malott, 2004, Prahalad & Doz, 1981). Meanwhile, 
the findings of the thesis also challenge previous studies which argue that adopting hierarchical 
structures can provide parent company management with information advantages, since 
authorizing business decision making powers to middle level management enabled by 
hierarchical structures can improve the information availability and reliability of top 
management (Chandler, 1990, Hoskisson, Harrison, & Dubofsky, 1991, Mahajan, 1986, Mihm, 
Loch, Wilkinson, & Huberman, 2010, Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005, Simon, 2013, Wang & von 
Tunzelmann, 2000, Williamson, 1985).       
Fourth, by seeking to explore the variations of the relationship with different moderators, this 
thesis supports some research in previous literature. Previous studies provide conflicting results 
in terms of the question of whether increases in corporate diversification are  positively 
correlated to information asymmetry between firms and outsiders (Clarke, Fee, & Thomas, 
2004, Gilson, Healy, Noe, & Palepu, 2000, Habib, Johnsen, & Naik, 1997, Krishnaswami & 
Subramaniam, 1999, Nanda & Narayanan, 1999, Thomas, 2002). By including corporate 
diversification as the moderator and differentiating corporate diversification into related and 




alleviate information asymmetry between firms and the capital market. This provides partial 
support for the strand of literature which finds that increases in corporate diversification may 
not be correlated to more severe information asymmetry (Clarke, Fee, & Thomas, 2004, 
Thomas, 2002). Thus, this study extends the previous studies and provides support to literature 
examining the linkage between corporate diversification and information asymmetry. 
This study has several implications. Firstly, this study provides implications for firm 
management and executives. Increases in corporate opaqueness can influence firms, since 
increases in opaqueness and reduction in transparency are found to increase the equity costs of 
the firms and negatively affect the firms’ capital structures and investment policies. Thus,  the 
information environment of outside investors is of great concern to firms (Aabo, Pantzalis, & 
Park, 2015, Barron, Sheng, & Thevenot, 2012, Durnev & Mangen, 2009, Francis, Nanda, & 
Olsson, 2008, Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999). As a result, managers  of firms frequently 
express their desire to mitigate information asymmetry between firms and outside investors so 
as to reduce equity costs and optimise capital structures (Gilson, Healy, Noe, & Palepu, 2000, 
Habib, Johnsen, & Naik, 1997). The findings in this study show that increases in firms’ 
hierarchical complexity can be positively related to higher levels of opaqueness and thus 
hierarchically complex firms are more likely to become opaque to outside investors on the 
capital market. Therefore, these findings provide a reference for firm management to take firm 
opaqueness into account when making corporate development strategies which may add to 
hierarchical complexity.  
Second, the study shows that increasing the quality of the host country institutional 
environment can mitigate the relationship between hierarchical complexity and opaqueness. 
These findings suggest that the protection of investors relies not only on the strict investor 
protection laws and regulations of the home country government which requires and promotes 




institutional environment. Hence, in cases where firms of the host country become 
hierarchically complex and have subsidiary companies operating in foreign countries, investor 
protection of the host country also depends on the improved institutional environment of other 
countries. Therefore, it is important for regulators and authorities of all countries to apply strict 
institutional rules and regulatory policies to regulate the behaviours of companies. The 
application of strict regulatory policies and the subsequent increase in the quality of the 
institutional environment together protect the interest and benefit of investors, both in the host 
country and the home country. 
 
6.2 Limitations and future research 
As with all studies, this study has several limitations which provide opportunities for further 
research. First, the study is restricted to US firms and only considers the impact of US firms’ 
hierarchical complexity on opaqueness. It should be noted that US firms may only represent 
exceptional cases in terms of the effects of complex organizational forms on corporate 
opaqueness. Since the sample of firms is only from one country which has a relatively larger 
percentage of complex firms, the US sample may only consider the most complex firms. 
Therefore, although the findings of the study reveal a positive relationship between hierarchical 
complexity and corporate opaqueness for US firms, this study calls for more research on the 
effects of hierarchical complexity on opaqueness in more diversified backgrounds. In particular, 
future research might extend the sample to other countries or regions to further examine 
whether such a relationship holds for firms from other developed countries or for firms from 
developing countries.  
Second, the robustness tests provide some mixed results in terms of checking for the presence 




the direction of causality could not be clearly identified in all robustness tests, although I adopt 
a series of strategies to address this. As indicated in the discussion section of the last chapter, 
it may be possible that more opaque firms are more likely to become hierarchically complex. 
This is because such firms tend to be involved in expropriation and tunnelling activities through  
establishing a greater number of self-owned intermediary companies and thus increasing the 
degree of hierarchical complexity (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000, 
Shleifer, Vishny, La Porta, & Lopez-de-Silanes, 2000). Future research that investigates the 
linkage between firm transparency and complex organizational forms and characteristics would 
be able to address the issue of potential reverse causality in the hypothesized relationships.   
Third, because this thesis focuses on the effects of hierarchical complexity on corporate 
opaqueness, which is defined as the ease with which firm specific information is released to 
outside investors on the capital market, I have invested most effort into investigating the 
hierarchical complexity of the firms and the information friction of outside investors. As a 
result, this study does not consider the more detailed roles played by management and chief 
executives in this relationship. As previous studies have suggested, management and chief 
executives may take advantage of firms’ complex characteristics to pursue self-interests such 
as increasing personal wealth and gaining prestige and power, among other self-serving 
interests at the expense of shareholders (Callen, Hope, & Segal, 2005, Jensen & Murphy, 1990, 
Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2004). Future studies could investigate the roles played by management 
in undertaking entrenchment activities in order to provide a more comprehensive picture of 
firms’ complex organizational forms and information asymmetry. 
Fourth, in regard to the firms’ hierarchical structures and the associated hierarchical complexity, 
this thesis only considers the levels of hierarchy and the number of subsidiaries located on each 
hierarchical level, and does not consider the span of control. Thus future research can further 




Finally, although this thesis has further examined how the relationship between hierarchical 
complexity and opaqueness varies with the moderating effect of the home country institutional 
environment, the quality of the home country institutional environment is measured by the total 
number of accounting and auditing professionals, financial analyst professionals and legal 
professionals scaled by the total number of firms that are geographically located in each US 
state. While this measure can provide some useful information about the institutional 
environment quality of each US state, it might not be able to fully reflect the institutional 
environment of the state. Thus, future studies could use more fine-grained measures that allow 
for capturing the US state’s institutional environment quality more comprehensively. 
Additionally, in terms of the moderating effect of the quality of the host country institutional 
environment, the potential dual moderation between host country institutional environment and 
firms’ experience in that host country could be investigated. Further, the panel data used in this 
study has a time period of 5 years between 2012 and 2016. Future research that uses 
longitudinal data spanning a longer period of time would be able to examine the hypothesized 
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